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REINSTATING EMPLOYER ACCOUNTABILITY
BY PROTECTING ALL FORMS OF
WHISTLEBLOWING: ERISA SECTION 510
Roshni Hemlani*
ABSTRACT
In the United States, employers who have little formal accountability
largely manage health and retirement benefits of the working
class. Employers face an enormous amount of responsibility to
properly manage and protect the health and retirement benefits of
their employees and their families. These organizational entities,
however, are not subject to similar institutional safeguards as major
public pension funds. Thus, Congress enacted the Employment
Retirement Income Securities Act to charge employers with
fiduciary duties of care over such plans.
However, the remedies for those who breach their duty by
mishandling funds or arbitrarily dispensing and denying benefits are
quite limited. The federal statute that governs preempts all state
remedies and all common law tort actions for bad faith. Thus,
disappointed policyholders and beneficiaries are limited only to the
remedy of ERISA Section 502. ERISA Section 502 establishes an
exclusive civil cause of action, but the federal court’s remedy is also
quite narrow. Congress’s inclusion of Section 510’s whistleblowing,
anti-retaliation provision acts as an additional safeguard to counter
employers’ significant lack of transparency and accountability by
encouraging employees and pension beneficiaries to bring to light
any allegations of fiduciary breach.
Given the limited public oversight of ERISA plans, a more
expansive interpretation of ERISA Section 510’s whistleblowing
provision is particularly important in order to allow it to be an
effective, safeguarding mechanism. Despite this, the federal circuits
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have split in Section 510’s application to internal, unsolicited
complaints.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an unresolved split among seven federal circuit courts on
whether employees are protected from employer retaliation for
internally reporting unsolicited Employment Retirement Income
Security Act1 complaints.2 The cases each circuit has considered have
been factually similar—an ERISA benefit plan participant, beneficiary
and/or employee administrator was allegedly discharged after
complaining about or objecting to an alleged ERISA violation. 3 The
alleged violations have all involved breaches of fiduciary duty—
assertions of impropriety in handling plans as opposed to a breach of a

1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. ch. 18 (2012)
[hereinafter ERISA].
2. See infra Part II.
3. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332, 333-35 (6th Cir. 2014); George
v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812, 813-14 (7th Cir. 2012);
Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010); Nicolaou v.
Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 327 (2d Cir. 2005); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337
F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003); Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1312, 131213 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 409-10 (9th Cir. 1993).
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plan itself.4 Benefit plan participants and/or beneficiaries have no claim
for compensatory or punitive damages, so the legal mechanisms for
holding plan administrators accountable to their legal obligations are
very limited and narrowed by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
law.5 Therefore, whistleblower allegations are a particularly important
safeguard in protecting such plans from abuse.6
The Fifth, Seventh and Ninth circuits have found that ERISA
Section 5107 protects an employee’s unsolicited internal complaints of
ERISA violations. 8 However, the Second, Third, and Fourth circuits
have expressly rejected this position and denied any whistleblower
protection to unsolicited internal ERISA complaints under Section 510.9
Most recently, the split has gained further traction as the Sixth Circuit
Courts of Appeals affirmed constraints of Section 510’s whistleblowing
provision by also rejecting whistleblower protection for unsolicited
internal complaints.10
This Note aims to analyze the persisting unresolved circuit split
regarding the boundaries of Section 510’s whistleblowing protection.11
Part I of the Note provides background on ERISA’s enactment, key
provisions of ERISA accountability safeguards and Section 510’s role to
protect and promote disclosure. Part II discusses each circuit’s position
regarding whether Section 510 protects unsolicited internal complaints
as well as the interpretive methods employed to reach said
determination. Part III explores external persuasive factors including the
Department of Labor’s position, the inadequacy of uniformed state law
remedies and the growing trend of protecting whistleblower disclosure.
All of these persuasive factors advocate for Section 510 to protect all
4. Sexton, 754 F.3d at 334-35; George, 694 F.3d at 813-14; A.H. Cornell, 610
F.3d at 219; Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 327; King, 337 F.3d at 422-23; Anderson, 11 F.3d at
1312; Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 409-10.
5. See Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, Welfare Benefits and Bad Faith: Losing
Sight of the Cathedral, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 387, 395 (2004).
6. See infra Part I.C.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012). This Note will refer to ERISA provisions by the
section number of ERISA instead of the section number in the United States Code.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1140; George, 694 F.3d at 817; Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315;
Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411.
9. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223; Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329; King, 337 F.3d
at 427.
10. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 2014).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
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forms of whistleblowing, including unsolicited internal complaints. Part
IV endorses a broad interpretation of Section 510, mandated either
judicially or legislatively, that would keep employers accountable to
their fiduciary duties by providing all ERISA whistleblowers the highest
and broadest level of protection.
I. BACKGROUND OF ERISA AND ITS FRAMEWORK
In order to determine the most appropriate way to interpret Section
510 to increase employer accountability, it is necessary to first
understand the basic framework of ERISA. 12 Part I focuses on the
overall intent, purpose and goals of ERISA’s enactment.13 Specifically,
this part examines the development of three ERISA concepts that
substantially affect employer accountability: fiduciary duty; 14 civil
enforcement;15 and preemption.16 Finally, this part details Section 510’s
whistleblowing and anti-retaliation aspects.17
A. UNDERSTANDING ERISA
In 1974, Congress recognized that the employee benefit plan sector
substantially increased in all aspects (size, scope, and value), but its
regulation remained minimal and ineffective. 18 Such benefit plans
include “any plan, fund or program . . . established or maintained by an
employer” that provides “medical, surgical or hospital care or benefits,
or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment.” 19 Thus, in 1974 Congress enacted the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act to “promote the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans” and “ensure that plans

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

29 U.S.C. § 1001.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1113.
29 U.S.C. § 1132.
29 U.S.C. § 1144.
29 U.S.C. § 1140.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4839-40.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1002.
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and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law.”20
Thus, ERISA enactment aimed to standardize the governance of private
pension and health care plans across the nation.21
ERISA covers pension benefit plans.22 An employee pension plan
includes a program or fund, which either “provides retirement income to
employees” or establishes “a deferral of income by employees for
periods extending to the termination of covered employment or
beyond.”23 ERISA sets minimum standards for most voluntary benefit
health plans to protect employees who elect to participate in such
plans.24 As a comprehensive federal law, ERISA includes information
regarding funding, participation standards and more importantly, the
fiduciary duties of those responsible for managing such plans.25
Congress enacted ERISA due to the increasing national public
interest in employee benefit plans.26 That interest continues to flourish
as the benefit plan sector exhibits tremendous growth—as of October
29, 2013, such welfare plans covered about 141 million American
workers, retirees and their families. 27 The ERISA plans also have
substantial authority and impact upon other non-retirement benefits such
as disability insurance, life insurance, severance pay and the provision
of health care.28 Employee benefit plans also have a considerable effect
20. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137, 142 (1990) (citing Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).
21. See
Health
Plans
&
Benefits,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/erisa.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1002; Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm. Defined benefit plans
allocate a specified monthly benefit amount at retirement, whereas defined contribution
plans do not. Id. In defined contribution plans, employers or employees, or both,
annually contribute a specified rate to the employees’ individual account under the plan.
Id. (last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(a)(1)-(2).
24. Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings – ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/erisa.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
26. Id.
27. Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year Agency Results, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsFYagencyresults.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
28. ERISA-governed welfare plans provide the majority of private health insurance
in the United States. For example, as of 2006, 62% (162.7 million) of non-elderly
Americans received health insurance from an employer. See Sara R. Collins, Chapin
White & Jennifer L. Kriss, Whither Employer-Based Health Insurance?, THE
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on interstate commerce, development of industries, growth of
employment opportunities and protection of employees.29 As of October
29, 2013, these plans included assets of over $7.6 trillion. 30 Because
such plans receive preferential federal tax treatment, they also have a
direct effect on United States revenues.31
Most importantly, however, the government drafted ERISA to
protect employee pensions. 32 ERISA is fundamental in protecting the
retirement security of Americans. 33 ERISA is an inclusive statute
designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in
employee benefit plans.34
The Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) is
responsible for enforcing ERISA and ensuring the integrity of the
private employee benefit plan system. 35 With such immense growth
comes the need to enforce employer administrator accountability. 36
EBSA oversees almost 684,000 retirement plans and approximately 2.4
million health plans. 37 In the 2013 fiscal year alone, a total of $1.69
billion dollars was collected from enforcement, voluntary fiduciary
COMMONWEALTH FUND, 7 fig.1 (Sept. 2007), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/
media/files/publications/issue-brief/2007/sep/whither-employer-based-healthinsurance—the-current-and-future-role-of-u-s—companies-in-theprovis/collins_whitheremployer-basedhltins_1059-pdf.pdf. This is important, as
Americans with private insurance make the most healthcare expenditures (79% in
2004). See, e.g., Gary Olin, Medical Expenditures of the Non-Elderly, MEDICAL
EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY (Jan. 2008), http://meps.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/
st197/stat197.pdf (discussing the impact of ERISA on medical expenditures).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
30. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 27.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
32. As stated by a Symposium participant, “ERISA was Congress’ attempt to
devise a comprehensive regulatory program to protect millions of American workers
who looked to private pension plans for financial support in their retirement years,”
JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, A
POLITICAL HISTORY 51 (2004).
33. ERISA-administered “retirement plans are the single largest source of income
[aside from Social Security] for aged Americans. Id. at 1-2.
34. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 103 (1983).
35. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 27.
36. See Frequently Asked Questions, ERISA FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATORS,
http://www.erisafiduciaryadministrators.com/index.php/faqs-2/ (last visited Jan. 12,
2014); U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 27.
37. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, supra note 27.
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corrects, and informal complaint resolutions.38 Additionally, in the 2013
fiscal year, EBSA investigations led to the indictment of 88 persons for
employment benefit plans crimes.39
B. ERISA ACCOUNTABILITY SAFEGUARDS: FIDUCIARY DUTY, CIVIL
ENFORCEMENT & PREEMPTION
It is evident that employer accountability was an underlying
principle in the enactment of ERISA when specifically examining the
Act’s fiduciary duty,40 civil enforcement,41 and preemption safeguards.42
This section will first focus on each congressional safeguard
individually and discuss their associated developmental trajectories.
Then, the section will collectively consider the direct impact of such
developments in the context of employer accountability.
1. Fiduciary Duty
ERISA requires employers to follow certain fiduciary conduct
standards.43 These duties are particularly significant with respect to the
level of protection granted by the Act. 44 In notable cases, the
whistleblowing assertions were from alleged impropriety in fiduciaries’
handling of plans, rather than breaches of the plans themselves.45
Under ERISA, persons who exercise discretionary control or
authority over a benefit plan (via management, administration or assets)
are automatically fiduciaries.46 ERISA requires benefit plans to contain
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1113.
Id. § 1132.
Id. § 1144.
Id. § 1104.
See id.
See Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014); George v.
Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2012); Edwards v. A.H.
Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media,
Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th
Cir. 2003); Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1312 (5th Cir. 1994);
Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993).
46. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993); see also ERISA
FIDUCIARY LAW 12-13 (Susan P. Serota & Frederick A. Brodie eds., 2d ed. 2006).
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“one or more named fiduciaries who . . . shall have authority to control
and manage the operation and administration of the plan.”47 The named
fiduciary is either named in the documentation of the plan or is
identified by the employing entity. 48 This fiduciary also has the
functional responsibility of exercising “discretionary control or
authority” of the “plan’s management, administration or assets.”49
Fiduciaries must uphold duties pursuant to ERISA Section 404(a).50
They may not circumvent or find exemption from these statutorily
required responsibilities in any employee benefit plan.51 Fiduciary action
is set to a specific code of conduct.52 This principally requires fiduciaries
to act “solely in the interest of the [plan’s] participants and
beneficiaries.”53 Section 404 requires fiduciaries to provide plan benefits
to participants and beneficiaries as well as to defray reasonable expenses
in administering the plan.54 They must execute their fiduciary actions
with great “care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances”
as a “prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims.”55 The fiduciary also has the responsibility of curtailing
risk of losses by diversifying plan investments, unless it is prudent to not
do so. 56 Additionally, the fiduciary must act in accordance with “the
documents and instruments governing the plan,” so long as they comply
with ERISA provisions. 57 Ultimately, the proper exercise of fiduciary
duty is adjudicated against how someone with expertise in the area
would act—a fiduciary is not exempt from Section 404(a)’s duties
simply due to their own lack of expertise in an area.58 Under Section
47.
48.
49.

29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262 (1993); see also U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); ERISA
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 13.
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A); ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 13.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a); see PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 14, 121 (2010).
52. 29 U.S.C. §1104.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
54. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
55. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
56. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
57. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
58. See, e.g., Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that attaining independent appraisals does not satisfy fiduciary duty); Fink v. Nat’l Sav.
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409, fiduciaries that fail to adhere to their fiduciary responsibilities may
be held personally liable for losses resulting from said failure.59
When it pertains to multiple plan fiduciaries, under Section 405, a
fiduciary may be liable for another fiduciary’s breach of duty.60 Liability
may also be established if the fiduciary “participates knowingly in, or
knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or omission of such other
fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach.”61 Thus, fiduciaries
with actual knowledge have a duty to discontinue providing assistance
to violating co-fiduciaries and to divulge said violations. 62 Failure to
take reasonable steps to remedy violations when a fiduciary has
knowledge of said violation may also result in liability.63 Although at
least one court held constructive knowledge to be sufficient, courts vary
in the amount of knowledge required to prompt the obligation to
reasonably remedy the violation.64 Lastly, fiduciaries may also be liable
if failure to fulfill their personal fiduciary duty facilitates a cofiduciary’s breach. 65 In this instance, a co-fiduciary does not need to
possess actual knowledge to be found liable.66 Instead, the ability for a
co-fiduciary to commit a violation because the fiduciary did not

& Trust Co., 722 F.2d 951, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“A fiduciary’s independent
investigation of the merits of a particular investment is at the heart of the prudent
person standard.”); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1474 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that obtainment of expert advice is allowed to fulfill the prudent person
standard of Section 404(a)); ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 237-38.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 12, 31.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a).
61. Id. § 1105(a)(1).
62. See id.; ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 377.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(3).
64. See, e.g., Silverman v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that fiduciaries can be held liable on if they have actual knowledge of
co-fiduciary breach); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding a
fiduciary must possess actual knowledge that the co-fiduciary breached); In re Dyngy,
Inc. ERISA Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 905-06 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding constructive
knowledge as sufficient); see also ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 377-78.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) (stating that a fiduciary is liable for another fiduciary’s
breach if the failure to comply with Section 404(a) “enabled such other fiduciary to
commit a breach”).
66. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 581
(S.D. Tex. 2003); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 378.
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appropriately comply with Section 404(a) is enough to find the fiduciary
liable.67
2. Civil Enforcement of ERISA
Section 510 and the ERISA civil remedies work in conjunction to
increase employer accountability. 68 Whereas Section 510 protects
whistleblowers that disclose fiduciary breach from adverse retaliation,69
Section 502(a) allows individuals to rectify and redress fiduciary
breaches via civil litigation.70
Congress’s chief purpose for enacting Section 502(a) is to provide
those injured by a statutory violation access to a suitable remedy.71 In
addition to mandating administrative review, ERISA also authorizes
civil litigation to rectify violations.72 Section 502’s “civil enforcement
scheme . . . is one of the essential tools for accomplishing the stated
purposes of ERISA.”73 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, Section
502(a) sets forth exclusive remedies available in ERISA civil
litigation.74 Specifically, subsection (1) to (3) contours the circumstances

67. In re Enron Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 580 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2));
see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 46, at 378.
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
69. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
70. See 29 U.S.C. §1132.
71. Congress specifically expressed this expectation in describing ERISA as
“providing for appropriate remedies.” Id. § 1001 (emphasis added). Additionally, the
statute’s civil enforcement provisions also implements several usages of the term
“appropriate.” Id. § 1001; id. § 1109(a) (“equitable or remedial relief as the court may
deem appropriate”); id. § 1132(a)(2) (“appropriate relief”); id. § 1132(a)(3)
(“appropriate equitable relief”). See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
72. See id. § 1132(a) (entitled “Civil Enforcement”); see also id. § 1001 (entitled
“Congressional findings and declaration of policy” and providing that “[i]t is hereby
declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect . . . the interest of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . by providing for . . . ready access to
the Federal courts.”).
73. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987).
74. Id. at 54 (“The deliberate care with which ERISA’s civil enforcement remedies
were drafted . . . argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA’s civil enforcement
remedies were intended to be exclusive.”); Mass. Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (“The . . . carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found
in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted, however, provide strong evidence that
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of three separate civil actions by which a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary may enforce ERISA.75
First, under Section 502(a)(1)(B), a participant or beneficiary can
bring an action for direct enforcement of the plan’s benefits, such as the
rights of plan or future benefits of the plan.76 Participants are likely to
use this option if they believe they have been wrongfully denied plan
benefits.77 Oddly, plaintiffs may file a lawsuit to recover benefits under
this subsection, unlike other civil litigation authorized by ERISA, in
either federal or state court.78 However, only a small fraction of benefit
denials actually results in litigation in either federal or state court.79
Second, under Section 502(a)(2), a participant, beneficiary,
fiduciary or the Secretary of Labor may bring an action against a
fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duties as defined in ERISA Section
409.80 If pertaining to a defined contribution plan, when the fiduciary’s
breach damages the assets of an individual account, individual recovery
is permissible. 81 However, if pertaining to a defined benefit plan,
Section 502(a)(2) limits the relief sought on behalf of the plan, and not
the individual.82

Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate
expressly”) (emphasis added).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1-3).
76. Id. §1132(a)(1)(B); see also JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA
LITIGATION 107 (3d ed. 2008).
77. ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 76, at 107; John H. Langbein, What ERISA
Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and
Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1334 (2003); see also Regina L. Readling,
Comment, Rethinking “The Plan”: Why ERISA Section 502(a)(2) Should Allow
Recovery to Individual Defined Contribution Pension Plan Accounts, 56 BUFF. L. REV.
315, 329 (2008).
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (“Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of
this section, the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction . . . ”).
79. See, e.g., Susan M. Mangiero, ERISA Fiduciaries Beware: Risk Is More Than a
Four-Letter Word, 19 PROB. & PROP. 65, 65 (2005) (explaining that according to the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, there were 9,167 new ERISA cases in 2000
and 11,499 in 2004).
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); see supra Part I.B.1.
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
82. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985); Susan
Harthill, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-
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Third, Section 502(a)(3) permits participants, beneficiaries or
fiduciaries, inter alia, to bring action to “obtain other appropriate
equitable relief” to redress violations or enforce provision of the
subchapter or the ERISA plan’s terms.83 Although this option is often
categorized as a “catch-all provision,” 84 the Supreme Court’s
interpretation has limited an individual’s ability to successfully litigate
mishandled ERISA plans.85 The Supreme Court continues to develop the
precise meaning of “equitable relief” in Section 502(a)(3), but has
rejected recovery of extra-contractual or punitive damages by injured
litigants.86
Thus, the Supreme Court has barred any ERISA recovery of
monetary compensation for consequential injuries caused by the
improper handling of benefit plans. This rejection is far-reaching
because it bars any such recovery under state law as well due to ERISA
preemption.
3. ERISA Preemption
Preemption of state law is key to how the Federal Circuits came to
interpret Section 510.87 The seminal case of each Circuit’s Section 510
interpretation relied upon the finding of ERISA preemption in order to
justify the action’s removal to federal jurisdiction and subsequent denial

Whole” Relief is Available Under ERSA Section 502(a)(3), 61 OKLA. L. REV. 721, 738
(2008).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B).
84. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996); ZANGLEIN & STABILE,
supra note 76, at 110.
85. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257 (1993) (rejecting the
government’s argument that participants and beneficiaries were entitled to seek
compensatory damages under Section 502(a)(3)’s “equitable relief” because, “at
common law, the courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over virtually all actions by
beneficiaries for breach of trust”).
86. See, e.g., Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 356 (2006)
(recognizing the remedy of equitable lien by contractual agreement as “typically
available in equity”). However, the Court continues to deny the categorization of any
remedy as equitable to allow recovery of monetary compensation for consequential
injuries of ERISA violations.
87. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
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of Plaintiff’s motion to remand to state court.88 Preemption is also the
sole reason state law causes of actions lose all traction if the court
determines an existing ERISA connection.89
Under Section 514, 90 ERISA expressly preempts state laws and
deems that it “shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any” benefit plan covered by ERISA. 91
Therefore, ERISA preempts the state law or claim if a state law relates
to something within ERISA’s scope, albeit indirectly. 92 ERISA
supersedes any state laws related to employment benefit plans covered
by ERISA largely due to the standardized, interstate nature of employee
benefit plans.93 With the intention that ERISA be “exclusively a federal
concern,” 94 Congress included this preemption to create a uniform
structure removed from “conflicting or inconsistent state laws.” 95
However, contrary to Section 514’s intention, some courts have had

88. See infra Part II. Circuit Split depicts the reoccurring trend of Defendants
removing the case to federal court claiming ERISA preemption after the Plaintiffs file
retaliation cause of action under state law in state courts. Subsequently, Plaintiffs lose
the ability to seek redress under state laws due to ERISA preemption and are therefore
are limited to civil remedies. See supra Part I.B.2.
89. See generally William Pierron & Paul Fronstin, ERISA Pre-emption:
Implications for Health Reform and Coverage, ISSUE BRIEF (Emp. Benefit Research
Inst., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.ebri.org/
pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_02a-20082.pdf (discussing the effects of ERISA pre-emption
on national health coverage).
90. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). “‘State law’ includes all laws, decision, rules, regulations,
or other State action having the effect of law . . . .” See also Richard A. Epstein & Alan
O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, ERISA Preemption, and
Class Actions, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625, 631 (2001) (“All courts seem to agree that
disputes over the coverage of an employee benefit plan relate to the administration of
the plan and thus come within ERISA’s general preemption clause.”).
92. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 1144; S.29 U.S.C. § 1144; S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 29 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865.
94. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981).
95. See 120 CONG. REC. 29, 933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Harrison A.
Williams, Jr.).
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difficulty determining if ERISA preempts state law, and thus, have
inevitably created a structure that conflicts from circuit to circuit.96
Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the ERISA preemption
clause broadly to hold that a state law “relates to” ERISA if it is in
“connection with” or with “reference to” a plan covered by ERISA.97
Furthermore, plaintiff’s state law claims, which rely on the existence of
or participation in ERISA plans, are also preempted.98 Therefore, a state
law cause of action that “duplicates, supplements, or supplants”
remedies under Section 502(a) is preempted by ERISA because it is
considered a federal claim.99
Although the Supreme Court recently constricted ERISA’s
preemption scope, it is limited to a very specific fact situation.100 In New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co., the Supreme Court held that ERISA did not preempt
vicarious liability malpractice claims brought against managed care
organizations. 101 The Court adopted this position based on the
“assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.”102 The Court reasoned that the state laws at issue
would still allow, rather than impede, the uniformed regulation of
employee benefit plans across the states.103

96. See, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 (3d Cir. 2003)
(Becker J., concurring) (noting the difficulty lower courts have had with the preemption
test).
97. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983); see also ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra
note 76, at 122.
98. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139-40 (1990) (holding
that ERISA preempted wrongful discharge state law when the reason for termination
discharge was to avoid contributing to the pension fund).
99. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004).
100. See ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 76, at 123.
101. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 649 (1995).
102. Id. at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947));
see also ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 76, at 132.
103. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 514 U.S. at 657-58.
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4. Constriction of ERISA Safeguards Ultimately Undermines Employer
Accountability
The narrowing of civil enforcement and ERISA preemption
mutually weakens employer accountability of ERISA violations, despite
the existence of employer fiduciary duties.104 The lack of civil remedies
such as punitive and consequential damages touched upon earlier105 is
exacerbated when assessed in conjunction with ERISA preemption.106
Even if a state law cause of action somehow survives Section 514’s
explicit preemption and it permits consequential or punitive damages,
Section 502(a) would also preempt it.107 The Supreme Court maintains
that allowing participants and beneficiaries to obtain supplemental
additional remedies under state law would undermine the intention to
“creat[e] a comprehensive statute for the regulation of employee benefit
plans.” 108 However, barring monetary compensation for consequential
damages (on both federal and state levels) has removed a plaintiff’s
financial incentive to pursue legitimate claims until attaining a
settlement or judgment. 109 In turn, the financial burden emplaced on
plaintiffs culminates in an overall under-enforcement, which eliminates
pressure upon fiduciaries and employers to remain accountable.110
In light of the Supreme Court’s deference to the administrative
decisions of ERISA fiduciaries,111 stronger remedies allowing recovery
may incentivize fiduciaries to not engage in violations.112 Furthermore,
the intent to fashion ERISA as the sole remedy also extends preemption
to bar wrongful retaliatory termination state claims if an underlying
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

29 U.S.C. § 1104.
See supra Part I.B.2.
29 U.S.C. § 1144.
See Stris, supra note 5, at 395.
See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004).
See, e.g., Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care
Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1055, 1068 (1996) (noting potential litigants “find it too expensive or too difficult
to pursue their objections through the costly and time-consuming judicial process”).
110. See Stris, supra note 5, at 395.
111. See John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident
Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
1315, 1321 (2007).
112. Sharon Tennyson & William J. Warfel, The Law and Economics of First-Party
Insurance: Bad Faith Liability, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 203, 240 (2008).
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ERISA relation exists. 113 In light of these limiting factors, it is
particularly important to determine which reading of Section 510,
narrow or broad, would hold employer fiduciaries accountable.114
C. THE ANTI-RETALIATION WHISTLEBLOWING ERISA PROVISION:
SECTION 510
1. Section 510: ERISA Anti-Retaliation Provision
In its creation of ERISA, Congress found it necessary to create a
framework of adequate safeguards relating to the establishment,
operation and administration of employee benefit plans to ensure an
unobstructed flow of information between participants and
beneficiaries. 115 As part of the ERISA system, Congress included
“various safeguards to preclude abuse and ‘to completely secure the
rights and expectations brought into being by this landmark reform
legislation.’”116 The precise safeguard that is the predominant concern of
this Note is the anti-retaliation whistleblower protection provision—
Section 510.
Section 510’s anti-retaliation provisions directly correlate to
ERISA’s goal of setting a fiduciary duty standard.117 Section 510 seeks
to protect employees and plan beneficiaries who report an alleged
fiduciary duty violation. 118 An employee or beneficiary who “gives
information or has testified or [is] about to testify in any inquiry or
proceeding relating to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act” is
protected from any resulting employer retaliation.119 Under Section 510,
it is unlawful for any person to retaliate against a participant or
beneficiary for exercising such protected rights granted under the
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142-43 (1990).
29 U.S.C. § 1140.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 137 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 36 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4872).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1140; see supra Part I.B.1.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (“It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine,
suspend, expel or discriminate against any person because he has given information or
has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter or
the Welfare and pensions Plans Disclosure Act.”).
119. Id.

220

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

employee benefit plan, under ERISA or the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act. 120 This includes protection from a broad range of
retaliatory actions such as: discharging, fining, suspending, expelling or
discriminating. 121 Section 510 is uniquely distinct from other statutes
about arbitrary and retaliatory discharge 122 because it expands
protections to a larger group of people: ERISA beneficiaries and
fiduciaries. 123 Congress specifically enacted this provision in order to
prevent “unscrupulous employers from discharging or harassing their
employees in order to keep them from obtaining vested pension
benefits.”124
2. Whistleblowing Laws
Whistleblowing provisions specifically serve protective
purposes. 125 A “whistleblower” is a person who seeks to correct or
change current practices by disclosing information about the current
practice. 126 The broad purpose of whistleblower provisions is to
eliminate the fear of retaliation for voicing concerns or grievances.127
Facilitating such admissions encourages transparency, disclosure and is
considered to be vital to a “democratic, free enterprise system.”128 As is
the case with Section 510, statutes that protect whistleblowers are not
required to specifically use the term “whistleblower.129 This protection
120. Id. (“It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel or
discriminate against . . . “).
121. Id.
122. E.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (2013)
(prohibiting discharges based on sex, race, color, religion or national origin); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2013) (prohibiting
discharges based on age); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(2013) (prohibiting discharges based on union organizing activity).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
124. Gavalik v. Cont’l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting West v.
Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980)).
125. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
126. MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 15 (Arthur P.
Brief et al. eds., 1992).
127. See Robert De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. at 292.
128. DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 22 (2d ed. 2004).
129. See id.
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of whistleblowers is naturally inferred from the anti-retaliation
provisions.130
A statute’s anti-retaliation provision “seeks to secure [a substantive
right] by preventing an employer from interfering (by retaliation) with
an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s
basic guarantees.” 131 Thus, anti-retaliation provisions are generally
understood to be “laws protecting whistleblowers . . . meant to
encourage employees to report illegal practices without fear of reprisal
by their employers.”132 Because such statutes generally employ broad
language to cover a variety of whistleblowing activities “when the
meaning of the statute is unclear from its texts, courts tend to construe it
broadly, in favor of protecting the whistleblower.”133 This interpretation
construction is often the best way to avoid illogical results that counter
“effectuate[ing] the underlying purposes of the law” and to ultimately
hold employers accountable.134
Whistleblowing is comprised of two reporting act categories:
internal and external. 135 The distinction between these two categories
lies at the heart of the Circuit courts’ fractured and conflicting
interpretation of Section 510’s protection.136 Internal whistleblowing is
when employees report or submit objections of alleged violations within
the organization. 137 External whistleblowing is when an employee
reports or submits objections to alleged violations outside the
organization to a governing agency, entity, officer etc. 138 Section 510
protects all external complaints (solicited and unsolicited) and internal
solicited complaints. 139 However, there is an interpretive dissention

130.
131.
132.

See id.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).
Haley v. Retsinas, 138 F.3d 1245, 1250 (8th Cir. 1998); accord Hill v. Mr.
Money Fin. Co., 309 F. App’x 950, 961 (6th Cir. 2009).
133. Haley, 138 F.3d at 1250; accord Mr. Money Fin. Co., 309 F. App’x at 961.
134. Haley, 138 F.3d at 1250; accord Mr. Money Fin. Co., 309 F. App’x at 961.
135. Terry M. Dworkin & Melissa S. Baucus, Internal vs. External Whistleblower:
A Comparison of Whistleblowing Processes, 17 J. BUS. & ETHICS 1281, 1281 (1998).
136. See infra Part II for an in depth discussion.
137. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 128, at 23.
138. See id.
139. The term “solicited” refers to instances when a whistleblower is requested,
encouraged, or investigated to disclose a violation and is prompted into whistleblowing
by another entity.
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about whether Section 510 protects unsolicited internal complaints.140
The purpose of this Note pertains to the fragmenting issue of whether
unsolicited internal complaints should be protected under ERISA
Section 510.
3. Language of Section 510
Interpreting Section 510 necessarily begins with construing the
statute’s language. 141 Section 510 of the ERISA provides, in relevant
part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
or discriminate against any person because he has given information
or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding
relating to this chapter or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
142
Act.

Section 510’s anti-retaliation whistleblowing protection requires
that: (1) the employee participated in a statutorily protected activity (2)
an adverse employment action was taken against the employee and (3) a
causal connection exists between the first two elements. 143 For the
purposes of this Note, the key interpretive objective is to understand the
scope of what constitutes statutorily protected conduct and whether
unsolicited internal complaints falls within this category.
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: ARE UNSOLICITED INTERNAL COMPLAINTS
PROTECTED?
Part II of this Note will address the interpretive conflict among
seven federal circuit courts regarding whether unsolicited internal

140. The Fourth, Second and Third Circuits have held that Section 510 does not
protect unsolicited internal complaints. See infra Part II.C for an in depth discussion.
141. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (7th ed. 1984).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
143. Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir.1992) (to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff “must prove that he participated in a
statutorily protected activity . . . that an adverse employment action was taken against
him . . . and that a causal connection existed between the two.”) (emphasis added).
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complaints are protected from retaliation under Section 510.144 Section
510 is universally understood to protect whistleblowing employees
when giving information or testifying in court about violations to
external entities such as the Department of Labor.145 However, the focus
of dissension is whether employees who voluntarily notify supervisors
or employers of ERISA violations within the company are protected
under Section 510. 146 Specifically, circuits are split about whether
unsolicited internal complaints fall within the ambit of Section 510’s
“inquiry or proceeding.”147 Part II will discuss the revival of this split
with the Sixth Circuit’s recent affirmation of Section 510’s protection,
and the urgent need for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.148 Next,
this part will discuss the seminal Section 510 interpretative cases in the
Ninth, Fifth and Seventh circuits and their holding that unsolicited
internal complaints are protected. 149 Lastly, this part will address the
seminal cases and contrasting interpretation of Section 510 by the
Fourth, Second, Third and Sixth Circuits, which denies unsolicited
internal complaints any whistleblower protection.150

144. Circuits Split over Whether ERISA Section 510 Applies to Retaliation Claims,
ERISA AND LIFE INSURANCE NEWS (Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP), Dec. 2012, at 14, http://smithmoorelaw.com/files/ERISA-December-2012-web-r.pdf.
145. See, e.g., Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir.
2010) (noting that had Defendant provided the complaint to an outside body they would
have been protected by Section 510); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427
(4th Cir. 2003) (articulating that an unsolicited external complaint would be protected).
146. See King, 337 F.3d at 427 (holding unsolicited internal complaints are not
afforded Section 510 whistleblower protection); cf. Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999
F.2d 408, 408 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding unsolicited internal complaints are afforded
Section 510 whistleblower protection).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
148. See generally SCOTT L. NELSON, GETTING YOUR FOOT IN THE DOOR: THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI (PUB. CITIZEN LITIG. GRP.), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/GettingYourFootintheDoor.pdf
(outlining
the
requirements and considerations for petitioning for certiorari from the Supreme Court).
149. George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2012);
Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1312 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of
Haw., 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993).
150. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014); A.H. Cornell,
610 F.3d at 223, Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328-29 (2d Cir. 2005);
King, 337 F.3d at 427.
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A. FURTHER FRACTURING OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REQUIRES SUPREME
COURT’S ATTENTION
The appeal of Sexton v. Panel Processing granted the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals a first-time opportunity to assert a position in the
unresolved circuit split about whether unsolicited internal ERISA
complaints are afforded protection.151 Their affirmation of the Eastern
District Court of Michigan’s denial of whistleblower protection has
further widened the gap between the circuits, resulting in tattered
protection across the states.152 Thus, it is increasingly imperative that the
Supreme Court grant certiorari to resolve this split amongst seven
circuits. 153 In doing so, the Supreme Court is likely to refer to and
address each circuit’s decision and rationale in order to glean an
interpretation that remains consistent with the intent and purpose of both
of ERISA broadly and Section 510 specifically.154
B. SECTION 510 BROADLY PROTECTS UNSOLICITED INTERNAL
COMPLAINTS
1. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to expressly adopt a proplaintiff interpretation of Section 510 in Hashimoto v. Bank of
Hawaii.155
Plaintiff Jessica Hashimoto alleged she was discharged from the
Bank of Hawaii in retaliation for reporting ERISA violations to
supervisors. 156 Hashimoto specifically objected to her supervisor’s
inappropriate direction to reimburse former employees from a profitsharing plan that had been properly withheld from a lump sum
distribution of his account.157 She also alleged that another supervisor
151.
152.
153.
154.

Sexton v. Panel Processing Inc., 912 F. Supp. 2d 457, 459 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
See Sexton, 754 F.3d at 332.
See NELSON, supra note 148.
See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325
(2011) (discussing circuit cases, definitions, state statutes and legislative history to
assess Fair Labor Standard Act’s anti-retaliation statute).
155. Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 408 (9th Cir. 1993).
156. Id. at 409.
157. Id. at 410.
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instructed her to violate ERISA regulations by recalculating a former
employee’s pension plan benefit using the final pay, and not the final
average pay. 158 Hashimoto contended that her unsolicited internal
objections to the alleged ERISA regulatory and fiduciary duty violations
and subsequent termination brought her within the realm of Section
510’s whistleblower protection.159
The Ninth Circuit expressly disagreed with the district court’s grant
of summary judgment for wrongful discharge in favor of Bank of
Hawaii.160 Bank of Hawaii had removed the case to district court, which
then granted summary judgment to the bank upon determining that
ERISA preempted Hashimoto’s state law claim.161 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Section 502(a) granted Hashimoto the
opportunity to bring a cause of action for relief. 162 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit determined ERISA completely preempted state law because the
case could be addressed as a federal action.163 The Court subsequently
remanded for trial on the basis that Hashimoto’s unsolicited internal
complaint should be characterized as an ERISA claim under Section
510.164
The Ninth Circuit reached the decision to extend Section 510
protection to unsolicited internal complaints by analyzing the antiretaliation provision’s language. 165 The court reasoned that because
Section 510 provides protection to any individual who gives
“information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or
proceeding” related to ERISA, Congress intended to protect
whistleblowers. 166 The Ninth Circuit also noted that Section 510 was
created as a safeguard to provide a remedy for an employee or plan
beneficiary that is terminated solely because they supplied vital ERISA
related information. 167 Thus, the court acknowledged that because the
statute was created specifically to protect whistleblowers, it is
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 412; see supra Part I.B.3.
See Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 409.
Id. at 411.
Id.
Id.
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reasonable to construe Section 510 to protect unsolicited internal
complaints such as Hashimoto’s.168
The court addressed the scope of Section 510’s protection of an
“inquiry or proceeding” by analyzing the process an employee would
undergo to submit a whistleblower complaint.169 The court reasoned that
the first step in giving information or testifying about a problem is to
present the issue in a complaint to those responsible for the ERISA plans
within the company, rather than directly proceeding to an outside
governing agency. 170 However, if an individual’s employment is
terminated for raising this issue, the process of giving information or
testifying is immediately halted. 171 The court reasoned that narrowly
construing Section 510 would allow employers to escape the
consequences of retaliation by encouraging the immediate dismissal of
employees to halt the whistleblowing process.172 Such an “anticipatory
discharge discourages the whistle blower before the whistle is blown.”173
Although the court did not address whether Section 510 protects all
employees discharged for submitting ERISA related complaints to
employers, the Ninth Circuit clearly endorsed a broad construction of
Section 510 upon determining that the provision was clearly meant to
protect whistleblowers.174
2. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit was the second circuit to determine unsolicited
internal complaints were protected under Section 510 in Anderson v.
Electronic Data Systems Corp.175
Plaintiff George Anderson claimed he had a Section 510 retaliatory
termination claim against his former employer Electronic Data Systems
Corporation, because the company allegedly terminated him for refusing
to engage in ERISA violating actions and subsequently reporting such

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Anderson v. Elec. Data Systems Corp., 11 F.3d 1312, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994).
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actions internally. 176 Anderson alleges that in violation of ERISA, he
was asked on two separate occasions to sign approval or payment
invoices on pension portfolios without the approval of the pension
trustees.177 Additionally, Anderson was also requested to write minutes
for Electronic Data Services’ Retirement Plan meetings he did not
attend, in violation of ERISA.178 Anderson refused to participate in any
of these requests and reported all such incidents to management.179 He
alleged he was demoted and discharged in retaliation for his refusal to
comply with the illegal requests and accordingly is protected under
Section 510.180
Rather than engage in statutory interpretation like other circuits, the
Fifth Circuit immediately and expressly accepted unsolicited internal
complaints to fall within Section 510’s protection.181 The Fifth Circuit
focused primarily upon whether the federal courts had subject matter
jurisdiction and if ERISA preempted state law claims. 182 As in
Hashimoto, defendant Electronic Data Systems also removed the case to
federal court, which led to summary judgment in favor of Electronic
Data Systems on the state wrongful discharge claim. 183 Anderson
subsequently appealed. 184 Anderson argued that because the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the wrongful discharge claim
should be remanded back to state court.185 In fact, in order to keep the
case in state court, Anderson had purposely removed all mention of
ERISA.186
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether ERISA preemption
applied when a federal cause of action is not asserted.187 The court began
this analysis by deliberating if Anderson’s state law claims were

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 1312.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1312-13.
Id. at 1313-15.
Id. at 1314-15.
Id. at 1313; Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 412 (9th Cir. 1993); see
supra Part I.B.3 (discussing preemption).
184. Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1313.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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preempted by ERISA.188 The court referenced the Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon 189 decision in which the Supreme Court held that ERISA
preempted state wrongful discharge claims because the claim depended
on the presence of an ERISA plan. 190 The wrongful discharge claim
conflicted with the ERISA Section 502 enforcement provision and fell
“squarely within the ambit” of Section 510.191 Therefore, the claim was
preempted. 192 The court determined that because Anderson’s claim
relied on his refusal to commit ERISA violations and he alleged being
terminated in retaliation for reporting ERISA violations, the claim
required the “existence” of an ERISA plan.193 Thus, ERISA preempted
the wrongful discharge state claim.194
In order to determine whether the court had subject matter
jurisdiction the court again looked to Supreme Court’s rationale, this
time in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor.195 Here, the Supreme
Court articulated that ERISA preempts a cause of action that can be
categorized under Section 502, which consequently enforces Section
510, and thus is removable to federal courts. 196 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the federal court had appropriate subject matter
jurisdiction because Anderson’s claim falls within the ambit of Section
510’s prohibition of discharging employees for providing ERISA related
information or testimony.197
3. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit, in George v. Junior Achievement of Cent.
Ind., Inc.,198 is the most recent circuit to determine Section 510 protected
unsolicited internal complaints.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See id.
See id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 133 (1990)).
See Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140.
Id. at 142.
See id. at 144.
Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314; see Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140.
See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314.
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (quoting Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1987)).
196. Id. at 52.
197. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315.
198. See George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812, 817 (7th
Cir. 2012).
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Plaintiff Victor George alleged wrongful termination for internally
raising attention to discrepancies of his ERISA plan. 199 As Vice
President of the Junior Achievement of Central Indiana, Inc., George
discovered money withheld from his salary was not being deposited into
either his retirement account or his health savings account.200 He then
lodged complaints with the corporation’s accountants and executives,
including the President and Chief Executive Officer.201 Although he did
share his concern with the United States Department of Labor, he
declined to file a written complaint. 202 Soon after expressing his
objections to members of the Junior Achievement’s board, George
received checks to make up for the missed deposit, including interest.203
In early January 2010, Junior Achievement noticed George had drawn
the account containing his deferred compensation.204 Considering this to
be premature, Junior Achievement sent a termination letter stating
George was discharged effective December 31, 2009 and required that
he immediately restore the withdrawn sums to the deferred
compensation account. 205 George responded by informing Junior
Achievement the amendment to his employee agreement noted
December 1, 2009 as the vesting date for his differed-compensation
account. 206 Regardless, Junior Achievement did not rescind George’s
termination. 207 George alleged he was terminated in retaliation for
initially raising objections about the discrepancy in his ERISA related
account and, therefore, he was protected by Section 510.208
The Seventh Circuit addressed this issue with an additional,
influential tool unavailable to any of the prior decisions: the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp. 209 The Kasten decision suggested that when dealing with
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

(2011).

Id. at 813-14.
Id. at 813.
Id.
Id.
Id. (noting Plaintiff received roughly $2,600).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 813-14.
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331
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ambiguous anti-retaliation provisions, courts should resolve the
ambiguity in favor of protecting employees if it is in accordance with
the statute’s purpose. 210 Although the Seventh Circuit did not discuss
preemption, it launched into a detailed approach to the statutory
interpretation of Section 510.211
The Seventh Circuit approached the issue by noting that the point
of disagreement is whether a Section 510 “inquiry” occurred. 212 The
Seventh Circuit engaged in its understanding of “inquiry” by parsing the
phrase to imply that Section 510 covers both informal and formal
approaches.213 The Court stressed that because the understanding of the
phrase can be construed both ways, the language is ambiguous.214 The
court recognized that dictionaries often contain both formal and
informal definitions of “inquiry” but the added Supreme Court decision
in Kasten encourages adopting an understanding that would primarily
protect employees and be consistent with the statutory context. 215
Ultimately, the court rejected adding modifiers such as “formal” or
“solicited” to the understanding of “inquiry” in Section 510 because the
text must be enforced as it is enacted, without any additions.216
The court also focused on the multiple definitions of “inquiry.”217
Despite the resulting awkward parallel construction, certain definitions
(if imported) would be applicable to covering the full range of formal
and informal inquiries. 218 The court provided the example of inquiry
being “[t]he action of asking or questioning” which would provide a
better, albeit awkward prose than purely limiting Section 510 to formal
proceedings and solicited inquiries.219
Furthermore, the court rebuffed the argument that if “inquiry” is
analogous with “question” then protection is applied only to questions
210. Id. at 1333-34; Crawford v. Metro. of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 278-79 (2009).
Kasten is discussed in depth in Part III.D.2.
211. George, 694 F.3d at 813.
212. Id. at 815.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. Id. See also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct.
1325, 1330 (2011).
217. George, 694 F.3d at 815.
218. See id.
219. Id. (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1010 (2d ed. 1989)).
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asked of employees but not by employees.220 The court contended that
no linguistic reason exists for why “inquiry” cannot refer to both
employee and employer questions. 221 The court reasoned that to hold
otherwise would illogically treat Section 510 to protectively cover only
half the dialogue between employer and employee. 222 The court
articulated that because Section 510 refers to inquire broadly, without
specification of who is initiating the inquiry, it therefore covers
employee inquiries. 223 The Seventh Circuit further focused on the
preposition “in” in the Section 510 phrase “in any inquiry or
proceeding.” 224 The court conceded that to interpret “inquiry” as
“question” would make its replacement in the phrase grammatically
incorrect. 225 However, the court stressed that the phrase is concerned
with the setting of the information, but not just where the information is
given, rather how the information is given.226
The Seventh Circuit also determined that a complaint is the first
step in an inquiry.227 The court found this argument to be particularly
persuasive because although a complaint standing alone is not “civil
litigation” it is the first step in a formal litigation process that would
make a more formal “inquiry” inevitable.228 Thus, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that regardless of whether or not the employee’s complaints
are solicited, Section 510 protects them. 229 Therefore, conversations
George engaged in regarding the potential breach of ERISA fiduciary
duties constituted an “inquiry” and required the district court’s judgment
against George be vacated.230

220. Id. (rejecting the Third Circuit’s approach in Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son,
Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010)).
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (emphasis added).
225. George, 694 F.3d at 815.
226. See id.
227. Id. at 816-17.
228. See Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 409-11 (9th Cir. 1993); see also
Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 863-64 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that the antiretaliation provision of the False Claims Act covers initial investigations and the first
step in an “action filed or to be filed”).
229. George, 694 F.3d at 817.
230. Id.
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C. SECTION 510 DOES NOT PROTECT UNSOLICITED INTERNAL
COMPLAINTS
Although the interpretations put forth by the Second, Third, Fourth
and Sixth Circuits do not protect unsolicited internal complaints, each
circuit implements varying interpretational approaches to reach that
supposition.231
1. Fourth Circuit: Only Formal Complaints Are Protected
The Fourth Circuit determined that Section 510 only protects
“formal” complaints in King v. Marriott International, Inc.232
Plaintiff Karen King alleged retaliatory discharge after objecting to
her employer’s alleged ERISA violations. 233 As an employee in
Marriott’s benefits department, around late 1998 to early 1999, King
was concerned over the appropriateness of the recommendation from
Compensation and Benefits Senior Vice President Frederick that
Marriott transfer millions of dollars into its general corporate reserve
account from its medical plan. 234 King expressed her reservations
regarding the propriety of such a transfer to coworkers and directly to
Fredericks. 235 In late 1999, after Fredericks promoted her, King once
again learned and consequently objected to the revival of the plan to
transfer funds in violation of ERISA. 236 King took several actions to
express her opposition, including protesting to Fredericks, expressing
her concerns about the transfer’s legal implications with two in-house
attorneys and obtaining an opinion letter from a Marriott in-house
attorney.237 In September 1999, the benefits department was restructured
and King was again promoted to Vice President of Benefits

231. See Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014); Edwards v.
A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussed infra Part II.C.3);
Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 327 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussed infra Part
II.C.2); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussed infra
Part II.C.1).
232. King, 337 F.3d at 421.
233. Id. at 423.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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Resources. 238 In early 2000 when another transfer of funds from the
medical plan was proposed, King again objected verbally and in writing
to Fredericks. 239 She was terminated soon thereafter. 240 King then
brought a claim alleging Marriot International, Inc. illegally retaliated
by terminating her for her lodged objections to the fund transfer.241
As most other plaintiffs, King originally filed an action under
Maryland public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine by
claiming that the discharge violated Maryland’s public policy. 242
Marriott, like the other circuit’s defendants, 243 removed the case to
federal court arguing ERISA preempted the state wrongful discharge
claim.244 The district court denied King’s motion to remand and granted
summary judgment in Marriott’s favor.245 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
deliberated whether Section 510 preempted King’s state law wrongful
discharge complaint. 246 Interestingly, unlike other circuits, the Fourth
Circuit held that because Section 510 did not cover King’s internal, thus
informal, complaint—her state law claim did not fall within the
boundaries of a federal ERISA claim. 247 Thus, after engaging in a
statutory interpretation of Section 510’s protection, the court remanded
the case to state court for further proceedings.248
The Fourth Circuit focused on the Section 510 language to
determine that only “formal” complaints were protected. 249 The court
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1312, 1313 (5th Cir. 1994);
Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 412 (9th Cir. 1993); see also supra
Part I.B.3.
244. King, 337 F.3d at 423.
245. Id. at 423-24.
246. Id. at 426-28.
247. Id. at 428. Contra Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1313; see Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 412
(finding state law was preempted by ERISA); see supra Part I.B.3.
248. King, 337 F.3d at 428; see also King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 866 A.2d 895, 906
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). The Maryland Court of Special Appeals ultimately rejected
King’s argument that her termination violated public policy, and consequently, the
claim did not fall within the public policy exception of Maryland’s at-will employment
doctrine.
249. King, 337 F.3d at 426-28.
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reasoned that “instituted” connotes “a formality that does not attend an
employee’s oral complaint to his supervisor.”250 In addition, the phrase
“given information” protected the provision of non-testimonial
information such as documents or evidence during an inquiry or
proceeding.251 The Fourth Circuit examined the factual basis of King’s
complaint and determined that King’s actions did not bring her within
the ambit of Section 510.252 The complaint lacked any information that
alleged King had testified in any legal or administrative proceeding or
provided information for such a proceeding under the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation. 253 Although King filed internal complaints with coworkers, supervisors and Marriott attorneys, the Fourth Circuit
determined ERISA does not provide a federal cause of action for such
unsolicited internal complaints.254
The court further justified the conclusion that Section 510 only
protected “formal” complaints by comparing the Section 510 phrase
“inquiry or proceeding” in relation with other statutes.255 In an earlier
interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) similar
provision, the Fourth Circuit determined the definition of “proceeding”
referred only to administrative or legal proceedings, but not to informal
internal complaints.256 Thus, the Court ruled that Congress intended the
FLSA to only protect employees who engage and testify in “formal”
proceedings. 257 The Fourth Circuit justified this result by stating that
Section 510’s anti-retaliation provision is much narrower than
counterpart provisions in Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, it
consequentially requires a “much more circumscribed remedy.”258
The Fourth Circuit recognized its narrow interpretation of a
formalistic requirement varied from Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ Section

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000).
King, 337 F.3d at 427.
See id.
Id. at 427-28.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 427.
Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 201 (FLSA); see Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360,
364 (4th Cir. 2000).
257. See Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d at 364.
258. King, 337 F.3d at 427 (quoting Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d at 364).
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510 determinations.259 The Fourth Circuit criticized the Fifth Circuit’s
approach for merely reciting Section 510 without addressing the facial
inapplicability to internal complaints or engaging in any statutory
interpretation. 260 It also argued that the Ninth Circuit’s protection of
unsolicited internal complaints was rooted fundamentally in the public
policy of protecting whistleblowers, despite recognizing that Section
510 may be inapplicable to internal complaints.261 Ultimately, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the notion of yielding results specifically aligned with
public policy when Section 510’s language can be compellingly
interpreted to deny protection to informal unsolicited internal
complaints.262
2. Second Circuit: Cautious Approach Requiring Relation to “Inquiry or
Proceeding”
The Second Circuit is the only circuit straddling the middle ground
between entirely rejecting protection to all unsolicited internal
complaints and affording them complete protection. 263 The court
cautiously addressed the parameters of Section 510’s protection in
Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc.264
Plaintiff Chrystina Nicolaou alleged being terminated after finding,
investigating and internally reporting ERISA violations at Horizon
Media, Inc. 265 As Director of Human Resources and Administration,
Nicolaou was both a participant in Horizon Media’s 401(k) employee
benefit plans regulated by ERISA and a fiduciary trustee due to her
occupational position. 266 Nicolaou allegedly discovered a decade-long
persisting payroll discrepancy that severely underfunded Horizon Media

259. See Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1312, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994);
Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993).
260. King, 337 F.3d at 428 (citing Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315); see supra II.B.2 for
Fifth Circuit analysis.
261. King, 337 F.3d at 428 (citing Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411); see supra II.B.1 for
Ninth Circuit analysis.
262. King, 337 F.3d at 428.
263. See Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 326-27.
266. Id. at 326; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
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Inc.’s 401(k) plan.267 Nicolaou divulged the matter once to Horizon’s
Chief Financial Officer, who told her to drop the issue, and twice to
Horizon’s controller who neglected to address or rectify the issue. 268
Upon recognizing that no remedial action was being taken, Nicolaou
consulted Mark Silverman, a Horizon attorney, who undertook his own
investigation into the matter and ultimately confirmed the ongoing
underfunding. 269 Nicolaou then met with the President of Horizon to
discuss the persistent underfunding. 270 Soon thereafter, Nicolaou was
demoted to Office Manager and two replacements were hired to assume
Nicolaou’s former duties as Director of Human Resources and
Administration. 271 She was ultimately terminated from Horizon and
consequently brought a Section 510 claim asserting her demotion and
termination for lodging ERISA violations was wrongful retaliation.272
Similar to the Fourth Circuit’s approach, the Second Circuit
focused its interpretation on contrasting Section 510 with other antiretaliation provisions.273 In reviewing the district court’s dismissal, the
Second Circuit determined that its previous ruling in Lambert v.
Genesee Hospital 274 was not controlling or decisive. 275 The Second
Circuit contrasted Section 510’s language with its whistleblowing
counterparts in the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 276 The Second Circuit held that Section
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 327.
See supra Part II.C.1 for Fourth Circuit analysis.
10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993).
Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id.; Fair Labor Standards Act 15(a)(3) codified at 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) makes
it unlawful “to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted
any proceedings under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in
any such proceeding[.]” Civil Rights Act of 1964 Section 704(a), codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a), provides that:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
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15(a)(3) of Fair Labor Standards Act does not apply to retaliation
resulting from unsolicited internal complaints, but rather, was limited to
instances when an employee lodged a formal complaint or cooperated
with a regulatory agency’s investigation. 277 Upon determining that it
could “find no distinction” between FLSA’s whistleblower provision
and ERISA Section 510 the district court dismissed Nicolaou’s claim
because Lambert limited protection to external or solicited
complaints.278
The Second Circuit found that FLSA, when contrasted with ERISA
Section 510, lacked any plain language that encompassed unsolicited
internal complaints made to a supervisor.279 Unlike the Fourth Circuit,280
the Second Circuit justified this distinction upon Section 510’s
“unambiguously broader” language than the language of FLSA’s
whistleblowing provision.281 The whistleblowing provision of the FLSA
extends retaliation protection to any person who “has filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under
or related to” the FLSA. 282 In comparison, ERISA Section 510 is
applicable to “any inquiry or proceeding relating to ERISA.”283
The Second Circuit next compared the connotations of
“proceeding” and “inquiry.”284 The court concluded that regardless of
the formal undertones of “proceeding” which may refer to the
progression of a lawsuit or any other action related to a court, agency or

subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
277. The court narrowly compared FLSA Section 15(a)(3) with the whistleblower
provision in Title VII to determine that the Section 704(a) of Title VII phrase “opposed
any practice” encompasses an individual’s complaints to supervisors regardless of
whether they also file other charges. See Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55.
278. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc, No. 01 Civ. 0785(BSJ), 2003 WL 22852680
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2003).
279. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328.
280. Supra Part II.C.1 for Fourth Circuit analysis.
281. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328 (citing Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55).
282. Id. at 328 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)).
283. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1140) (emphasis added).
284. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328-29 (comparing the definition between Black’s Law
Dictionary and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).
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other official body, “inquiry” refers broadly to any request for or
gathering of information.285
Although the Second Circuit, did not address the broader question
of whether Section 510 covers unsolicited complaints, 286 the court
cautiously distinguished the Nicolaou decision from King, in which the
Fourth Circuit applied clear limits on Section 510. 287 Rather than
undertake the Fourth Circuit’s approach of focusing on the formality or
informality of the circumstances, the Second Circuit relied on whether
the circumstance surrounding the provision of information constitutes an
ongoing “inquiry.” 288 Thus, the Second Circuit applied a restrained
approach to the interpretation of Section 510 and distinguished King for
failing to interpret “inquiry” distinctly from proceeding.289 The Second
Circuit also recognized that applying narrow reasoning, limits an ERISA
fiduciary to four options: “(1) do nothing and face possible co-fiduciary
liability under ERISA Section 405; (2) make [their] own inquiries
among [their] superiors and face a retaliatory response; (3) bring the
matter to the attention of a regulatory agency and hope that doing so is
not discovered by [their] superiors, at least until the agency begins its
own inquiry; or (4) take upon [their self] the burden, and the uncertain
prospects, of filing a suit under the provision of ERISA which allows
fiduciaries to seek ‘to enjoin any act or practice that violates’ the
statute.” 290
Nicolaou’s holding is limited to the finding that if Nicolaou could
demonstrate that counsel arranged the meeting between Nicolaou and
Horizon Media’s CEO, the meeting would fall “within the definition of
an ‘inquiry’” and therefore be protected by Section 510.291 The Second

285.
286.

Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329.
Id. at 332 (Pooler, J. concurring) (stating that, despite Nicolaou’s unclear
scope, an “inquiry” within Section 510’s parameters occurred when she began
conducting her own inquiry into the alleged payroll violation and “not merely from the
point at which [she and outside counsel met with Horizon Media’s officials]”).
287. Id. at 329 (citing King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir.
2003)).
288. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330; King, 337 F.3d at 427 (determining that the usage of
“inquiry or proceeding” regards only “the legal or administrative, or at least . . .
something more formal than written or oral complaints made to a supervisor”).
289. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330.
290. Id. at 331 (Pooler, J., concurring).
291. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330.
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Circuit is the only circuit to take a middle ground approach that refrains
from embracing a decisive rejection or acceptance of whether
unsolicited internal complaints are protected.292
3. Third Circuit: Unsolicited Complaints are Not Protected
The Third Circuit also held that unsolicited internal complaints are
outside of Section 510 protection in Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son,
Inc.293
Plaintiff Shirley Edwards contended that upon discovering alleged
ERISA violations, she was wrongfully terminated from her position for
raising objections. 294 Edwards, in her capacity as Director of Human
Resources, alleged finding ERISA violations. 295 She claimed to have
discovered the corporation was engaging in many ERISA violations
such as: administering group health plans in a discriminatory way,
attempting to deter employees from opting into benefits by
misrepresenting the cost of group health coverage, and providing false
social security numbers and information to insurance carriers in an effort
to enroll non-citizens in the corporation’s ERISA plans. 296 Edwards
alleged that her employment was terminated for complaining about the
described violations to A.H. Cornell’s management. 297 Edwards
contended she fell within Section 510’s ambit and had a claim against
her employer for wrongfully retaliatory termination resulting from
lodging ERISA-related complaints.298
The Third Circuit built its decision about Section 510’s protection
by analyzing the plain language meaning of “inquiry.”299 Finding that
Edwards had duly “given information” by objecting to management
about the alleged violations, the Third Circuit approached the scope of
Section 510 by determining if the objection was part of any “inquiry or
proceeding.” 300 The Third Circuit rejected Secretary of Labor’s
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
610 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 218.
Id. at 218-19.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 222.
Id.
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argument that “[b]roadly but naturally construed, ‘any inquiry or
proceeding’ encompasses plan participants’ complaints to management
or plan officials about wrongdoing, and the process by which that
information is considered, however informal.” 301 Instead, the court
referred to Black’s Law Dictionary definition of, “[a] request for
information.”302 Because Edwards was not approached or requested to
provide information regarding the ERISA violation, but rather
voluntarily lodged a complaint on her own accord, the court rejected
Edwards’ claims.303
Furthermore, the court rejected Edwards’ argument that her
objections and complaints were themselves an inquiry. 304 The court
found that the complaints were mere statements, not questions seeking
information. 305 Section 510 protects employees who have “given”
information but not those who have “received,” so a plain reading would
limit that inquiries be made of an employee, but not by an employee.306
The court held that although the complaints could eventually have led to
a protected inquiry, they had not developed to be protected by Section
510 when Edwards was terminated.307
The Third Circuit also interpreted “proceeding” in line with the
Fourth and Second Circuit to constitute a formal, administrative
progression and are thereby inapplicable to Edwards’ complaints.308 The
ruling meant no inquiry or proceeding, under the terms’ plain meanings,
occurred.309 The district court dismissed Edwards’ claim after finding,
under the Second Circuit’s analysis in Nicolaou, Edwards’ complaints to
301. Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Hilda L. Solis, as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant at 16, Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir.
2010) (No. 09-3198).
302. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (9th ed.
2009)).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 (9th ed. 2009)) (defining
proceeding as “[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit” or the “procedural
means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.”); see Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 32829 (comparing the definition between Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary).
309. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223.
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A.H. Cornell management did not constitute an “inquiry or
proceeding.”310
The Third Circuit also justified its decision that Section 510 of
ERISA is distinguished from the similar anti-retaliation provisions in
Section 704(a) of Title VII.311 Opposed to Section 510, Section 704(a) of
Title VII employs broad language to extend expansive protection to
employees that have “opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by [Title VII]”.312 Much like the Fourth Circuit,
the Third Circuit found it persuasive that because Congress declined
employing the same broad language in Section 510, the protections
afforded must differ.313 Furthermore, the court found the Ninth and Fifth
Circuit’s contrary decisions to be unpersuasive.314
The Third Circuit also rejected the argument put forth by Edwards
and the Secretary of Labor that Section 510 should be read broadly
because it is a remedial statute.315 The court held that ERISA provisions
should only be “liberally construed” if the statutory text was ambiguous
but because Section 510 provided an “unambiguous” plain meaning, the
statute should not be liberally construed. 316 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that had Congress intended a broader reading that denial of
unsolicited internal complaints would undermine the provision’s
purpose, Congress would have used broad language.317 Thus, the Third
Circuit held Edwards’ complaint did not fall within the ambit of Section
510 because it does not protect unsolicited internal complaints.318
Judge Cowen dissented from the court’s narrow construction of
Section 510’s protection for multiple reasons and instead argued that

310. Id. at 219; see generally Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d
Cir. 2005) (declining to extend Section 510 protection to unsolicited internal
complaints).
311. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223; 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(2012).
312. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (2012)).
313. Id.; see King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003).
314. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223. The Third Circuit noted that the Fifth Circuit
only “gave the issue cursory treatment” and the Ninth Circuit concentrated not on the
statutory language but rather what would constitute a “‘fair’ interpretation.”
315. Id.; Brief for Appellant at *9-10, A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d. 217 (3d Cir. 2009)
(No. 09-3198), 2009 WL 6870703.
316. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 223.
317. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 224.
318. Id. at 218.
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ERISA protected unsolicited internal complaints.319 Judge Cowen’s first
point of disagreement is the majority’s classification of the statutory
language as unambiguous. 320 Instead, Judge Cowen classifies the
statutory language as ambiguous because it is extremely unlikely
Congress intended ERISA’s anti-retaliation provision to deny protection
to a category of whistleblowing conduct.321
The second fault Judge Cowen uncovers in the Third Circuit
majority’s decision is the disregard shown to the role Section 510 plays
in safeguarding ERISA.322 Congress included Section 510 as a safeguard
in order to deter violations and “to completely secure the rights and
expectations brought into being by this landmark reform legislation.”323
Congress viewed this anti-retaliation provision as an essential facet in
the implementation of the ERISA scheme because it “helps to make
[ERISA’s] promises credible.”324 Judge Cowen puts forth that Congress
clearly viewed this anti-retaliation to be a crucial statutory safeguard of
ERISA “because, without it, employers would be able to circumvent the
provision of promised benefits.”325
Most importantly, Judge Cowen criticizes the court’s unsustainable
interpretation because it leaves the field of ERISA protection in absolute
disarray.326 He criticizes that in defining “inquiry,” the court adopts the
Fourth and Second Circuit’s narrow interpretation, when in reality,
providing employees protection only after an initiated internal
investigation is “unworkable in certain circumstances.”327 He illustrates
that the interpretation put forth only protects employees when they are
asked a follow up question by a supervisor after lodging an ERISA
complaint.328 He reasons that under this interpretation the employee is

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 226-27 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 226 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (quoting S.Rep.
No. 93-127 at 36 (1973)).
324. Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
520 U.S. 510, 515 (1997).
325. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 143 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-127 at 35-36;
H.R.Rep. No. 93-533 at 17 (1973)).
326. A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d at 227 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 228.
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not wholly protected and a supervisor is wrongly incentivized to
immediately retaliate against the employee rather than conduct an
investigation or raise questions regarding the matter.329
4. Sixth Circuit: Only Information in Inquiries are Protected
In 2012, the Eastern District Court of Michigan denied Section 510
protection to Plaintiff Brian Sexton for his unsolicited internal
complaint, an email informing his employer of Sexton’s intention to
report ERISA violations to both state and federal employees.330 Sexton
alleged his email complaint resulted in the subsequent termination of his
position at Panel Processing.331
The district court’s rationale hinged on Section 510’s language of
“inquiry or proceeding” and the determination that the threatening email
lacked any connection to either an inquiry or proceeding.332 The court
narrowly construed “inquiry” to mean “the act or an instance of asking
for information.”333 The Eastern District Court of Michigan concluded
that when information regarding ERISA is not requested or solicited by
any person, there exists no “inquiry.” 334 The court also decided that
Sexton’s ERISA related email did not constitute a proceeding because
“proceeding” means “the course of procedure in a judicial action or in a
suit in litigation.” 335 Because Sexton had not given information in an
inquiry or proceeding, the Eastern District Court of Michigan held
Sexton’s unsolicited internal complaint outside of Section 510’s
protection.336 The court justified this restrictive construction of Section
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id.
Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
Id. at 459.
Id.
Sexton, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 459; WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1167 (unabridged ed. 2002). BLACK’S also defines “inquiry” as “[a]
request for information.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (8th ed. 2004).
334. Sexton, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
335. Id. Analogously, BLACK’S defines “proceeding” as the “regular and orderly
progression of a lawsuit,” the “business conducted by a court or other official body” or
“[a]ny procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.” See Nicolaou,
402 F.3d at 328-29 (comparing the definition between Black’s Law Dictionary and
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).
336. Sexton, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 475. Although Sexton had not taken his complaints
to the U.S. Department of Labor, he had spoken with several lawyers after sending the
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510’s language on the belief that because Congress chose this particular
language, to extend the meaning beyond the language would counter the
congressional intent of the statute.337
The Sixth Circuit has affirmed the Eastern District Court of
Michigan’s decision regarding the range of Section 510. 338 The Sixth
Circuit put forth an interpretation on this issue within this past year after
hearing oral arguments from both parties. 339 Although the court
recognized that Sexton was not attempting to claim the email amounted
to testimony in an inquiry or proceeding, the court was particularly
focused on whether the email constituted “giv[ing] information . . . in an
inquiry.” 340 While the court conceded that the email was giving
information, they held that it was not for an inquiry, or an official
investigation.341
The Sixth Circuit, in its decision, placed an emphasis on dissecting
the clauses of other whistleblower claims.342 Essentially, whistleblower
protection laws fall into two categories: 1) clauses to protect those who
provide information in an inquiry and 2) those that protect people who
oppose unlawful practices.343 The court surmised that because Congress
had only included the first type category in Section 510, Congress
intended to exclude protecting people who oppose, report, or complain
about unlawful practices. 344 The courts perspective was that “[w]here
words differ as they differ here, Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”345

email about lawsuit options). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (providing whistleblower
protection to a person who “has given information or has testified or is about to testify
in any inquiry or proceeding”).
337. Sexton, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60.
338. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014).
339. Brief of Defendants – Appellees Panel Processing, Inc. at 10, Sexton v. Panel
Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (2014) No. 13-1604, 2013 WL 4401115 at *10; Brief of
Plaintiff – Appellant Brian Sexton at 3, Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332
(2014) No. 13-1604, 2013 WL 3795752 at *3.
340. 29 U.S.C. §1140 (2012); Sexton, 754 F.3d at 334.
341. See Sexton, 754 F.3d at 335.
342. Id. at 335.
343. See id. at 335.
344. See id. at 336.
345. Id. at 336 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63
(2006)).
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III. SECTION 510 SHOULD PROTECT UNSOLICITED INTERNAL
COMPLAINTS
Part III analyzes the issue of what lies in Section 510’s future. As
mentioned, this year the Sixth Circuit put forth its own interpretation of
Section 510’s protection in the appeal of Sexton. 346 Given the sheer
magnitude of the split and the growing number of involved circuits, the
grant of certiorari could ultimately resolve the split. 347 Should the
Supreme Court grant certiorari, Part III focuses on persuasive arguments
and tools that may be consulted or referred to in determining whether
unsolicited internal complaints are protected. First, the Secretary of
Labor has consistently advocated for a broad reading of Section 510.348
Next, this Part addresses the basis of statutory construction that may be
employed in interpreting Section 510’s protection. Then, Part III will
recognize state remedies inadequacy of providing uniform remedies to
employees across the nation. Part III also explains that although state
whistleblowing laws have the capacity to broadly encompass unsolicited
internal complaints, not all states have enacted such comprehensive
whistleblowing laws. Additionally, a comparison to broad state and
federal whistleblowing laws will depict a national trend of increasing
whistleblower protective coverage. Lastly, Part III focuses on the
adverse obstacle proponents of a broad Section 510 whistleblower
coverage face if the Supreme Court utilizes textualism.

346.
347.

See Sexton, 754 F.3d 332; see supra II.A. for discussion.
NELSON, supra note 148, at 3; see, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance
Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1330 (2011) (Supreme Court granting certiorari to
resolve circuit split of FLSA’s anti-retaliation statute).
348. See Part III.A; see, e.g., Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant for Reversal at 5, Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325
(No. 03-9186) (advocating a broad interpretation of Section 510 to include unsolicited
internal complaints); Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Hilda L. Solis, as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind.,
Inc., 694 F.3d 812 (No. 11-3291) (advocating a broad interpretation of Section 510 to
include unsolicited internal complaints).
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A. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
The Secretary of the Department of Labor has remained active in
these cases by submitting Pro-Plaintiff amicus curiae briefs. 349 If a
petition of certiorari is successful and the Supreme Court addresses the
circuit split regarding Section 510, the Secretary’s position may be of
some relevance.350
The Secretary of the Department of Labor has submitted several
briefs as part of its advocacy for a broad construction of Section 510.351
The Supreme Court Justices have previously questioned the propriety of
providing Chevron deference to such amicus curiae briefs.352 The Court
left the question unanswered and thus lower courts are only required to
apply Chevron deference when an agency has the authority to issue
regulations or enforce the rules in administrative proceedings.353
The Secretary’s power is limited to that of a prosecutor, namely
bringing suits and asking for judicial enforcement. 354 Prosecutors,
however, are not delegated any rulemaking or adjudicative authority in
regards to Section 510.355 “[B]ecause Congress has expressly established
349. See Part III.A; see, e.g., Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant for Reversal at 6-7, Nicolaou, 402 F.3d 325 (No. 03-9186)
(encouraging the reversal of the lower court’s narrow interpretation of Section 510);
Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Hilda L. Solis, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff
at 11, George, 694 F.3d 812 (No. 11-3291) (endorsing a broad interpretation of Section
510).
350. E.g. NELSON, supra note 148, at 14 (discussing the petitioning process for
Supreme Court certiorari).
351. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant
for Reversal, Nicolaou, 402 F.3d 325 (No. 03-9186); Brief of the Secretary of Labor as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, George, 694 F.3d 812 (No. 11-3291).
352. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2165-69
(2012) (discussing whether amicus curiae briefs require Chevron deference); see also
Chevron, USA Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 846 (1984)
(holding courts must defer to the statute interpretation made by government agencies
responsible for enforcing them, unless the interpretation is unreasonable).
353. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (“We have long recognized that considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative
interpretations.”).
354. See ERISA Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
erisa_enforcement.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
355. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5)-(e)(1).

2014]

REINSTATING EMPLOYER ACCOUNTABILITY
BY PROTECTING ALL FORMS OF WHISTLEBLOWING

247

the Judiciary and not the Department of Labor as the adjudicator of . . .
rights of action arising under the statute,” Chevron deference does not
apply.356 Thus, despite submitting amicus curiae briefs, the court has not
always accepted the Department of Labor’s position. 357 Therefore,
although the Secretary’s arguments may receive respectful
consideration, the law does not require courts to “defer” to the
Department’s position.358
In the context of Section 510’s language, the Secretary clarifies
that, unlike the words “testify” and “proceeding,” terms such as
“information” and “inquiry” have an extremely broad scope,
encompassing both internal and external complaints.359 Additionally, the
Secretary specifically notes the Seventh Circuit’s broad approach in
George appropriately recognized that “inquiry” is modified by the allencompassing term “any.” 360 Section 510 prefaces the mention of
information given in “any inquiry” making it evident that Congress
intended to cover “all kinds of investigation- whether formal or
informal, internal or external.” 361 The Secretary of the Department of
Labor also criticized the Fourth Circuit’s King rationale because it failed
to address what distinguishes “inquiry” and “proceeding.” 362
Furthermore, the King court did not adequately consider the
differentiation of scope between “given information” and “testify.”363

356.
357.

See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990).
See, e.g., Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellant for Reversal at 12, Nicolaou, 402 F.3d 325 (No. 03-9186) (providing
reasoning for adopting a broad interpretation for Section 510 that the court did not
adopt).
358. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
359. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant
for Reversal at 6-7, Nicolaou, 402 F.3d 325 (No. 03-9186).
360. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Hilda L. Solis, as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, George, 694 F.3d 812 (No. 11-3291); see also
Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 126 (2002) (quoting United
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)) (explaining that “‘the word ‘any’ has an
expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind’“).
361. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant
for Reversal at 7, Nicolaou, 402 F.3d 325 (No. 03-9186).
362. See Brief for Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting PlaintiffAppellant at 17-18, George, 694 F.3d 812 (No. 11-3291).
363. Id. at 17-18.
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Most importantly, the Secretary of the Department of Labor argues
that the recommendation for a broad interpretation is aligned with the
purpose of ERISA and the Supreme Court’s policy. 364 Specifically,
because ERISA is a remedial statute, “inquiry” should be broadly
construed to protect unsolicited internal complaints since “[ERISA]
should be liberally construed in favor of protecting the participants in
employee benefit plans.”365
B. PRINCIPLES OF SECTION 510’S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The potential analysis of ERISA’s anti-retaliation provision by the
Supreme Court will begin with an examination of Section 510’s
statutory language.
Although legislative intent is not dispositive, the Supreme Court
will likely consider the legislative intent of both Section 510 and
ERISA. There is a presumption that “legislation reflects the will of the
people, and a clearly expressed ‘legislative intent’ is consistent with the
public’s reasonable expectations.”366 As previously discussed,367 ERISA
was envisioned as a means of protecting pensions from tampering,
mishandling or misuse. 368 Additionally, whistleblowing anti-retaliation
statutes are generally a means of employer accountability to “secure [a
substantive right] by preventing an employer from interfering (through
retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement
of the [Act].” 369 In light of fiduciary duties, preemption, and civil

364. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 133435 (holding that the anti-retaliation provision should be resolved in light of what is fair
to employees); Crawford v. Metro. of Nashville, 255 U.S. 271, 278-79 (supporting the
same proposition).
365. See IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118,
127 (3d Cir. 1986).
366. 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45:6 (7th ed.)
367. See supra Part I.A.
368. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974 1 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005) (“ERISA was Congress’ attempt to devise a
comprehensive regulatory program to protect millions of American workers who
looked to private pension plans for financial support in their retirement years”).
369. Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).
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remedies, 370 it is clear that Congress designed Section 510 as an
additional safeguard to hold employers accountable.371
Additionally, the Supreme Court is likely to presume that Congress
intends the statutory text to be read in accordance with its plain
meaning, and that none of the enacted language is superfluous.372 Thus,
Congress’s inclusion of both terms “inquiry” and “proceeding,” rather
than the single term “proceeding” included in the Fair Labor Standards
Act Section 15(a)(3), indicates the intention “to give the nouns their
separate, normal meanings” and go beyond the protection afforded by
the FLSA. 373 That, in conjunction with the broad range of prohibited
retaliatory actions 374 and the broad coverage of people,375 indicates the
Congressional intent for ERISA to be construed broadly.
C. INADEQUACY OF STATE LAW REMEDIES
As discussed in Part I.B, the Supreme Court may take into account
the amount of protection state laws afford whistleblowers when
addressing what Section 510 protects. 376 If ERISA does not protect
internal complaints, federal courts will dismiss an internal complaint for
a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.377 Instead,
employees will have to bring retaliation claims under state law, subject
to a particular state’s laws.378 However, due to ERISA preemption, such
state claims are likely to be preempted from providing individuals
370.
371.
372.

See supra Part I.B.
29 U.S.C. § 1140.
BedRoc Ltd. v. United Sates, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004); TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).
373. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73 (1984).
374. 29 U.S.C. §1140 (protecting against retaliatory actions such as discharging,
fining, suspending, expelling or discriminating).
375. Id. (extending coverage to fiduciaries and beneficiaries).
376. State Whistleblower Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-whistleblower-laws.aspx
(last visited Jan. 4, 2014).
377. See, e.g., Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir.
2010) (dismissing for failure to state a claim after holding that unsolicited internal
complaints do not fall within ERISA).
378. See, e.g., King v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003)
(remanding after finding that claim was preempted by ERISA but that the employee’s
state law wrongful discharge claim was not entirely preempted).
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appropriate relief. 379 As demonstrated in King, because state
whistleblowing statutes generally only protect external violation
allegations, if Section 510 is read narrowly, employees will be
unprotected for bringing forth unsolicited internal complaints.380
Most importantly, reserving remedies to the states is an inadequate
solution due to the lack of conformity among state laws. 381 Because
comprehensive whistleblower laws remain absent in many states,382 the
lack of broad ERISA Section 510 federal protection results in uneven
whistleblower protection from state to state. 383 Ultimately, this
undermines the Congressional intent to protect benefit plans and
structure ERISA as a comprehensive, uniform act.384
Thus, if applied broadly, Section 510 has greater potential to
protect employees who suffer from employer retaliation than under state
laws.385 Furthermore, if an employee is in a circuit that broadens ERISA
protection to unsolicited internal complaints, 386 the only remaining
burden is to prove a causal connection exists between the lodged

379.
380.

See supra Part I.B.3.
See King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 866 A.2d 895, 906 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005)
(rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that her termination violated public policy and thus fell
within the Maryland’s at-will employment doctrine’s public policy exception).
381. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 at (A)(3)(c)(ii) (2012) (West)
(protecting disclosures when the employee has reasonable belief of a violation) ; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(a)(1) (West 2006) (protecting employees who disclose or threaten
to disclose a violation of law); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(b) (West 2013)
(protecting employees who report a violation or suspected violation orally or in
writing); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(b) (West 2014) (protecting employees who disclose
or may disclosed information).
382. See State Whistleblower Statutes, NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER,
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=742&I
temid=161 (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).
383. See Trystan Phifer O’Leary, Note, Silencing the Whistleblower: The Gap
Between Federal and State Retaliatory Discharge Laws, 85 IOWA L. REV. 663, 689
(2000).
384. See supra Part I.A.
385. See NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER, supra note 382 (depicting the lack
of general state whistleblower protection, and observing that only 17 of the 50 states
provide a statutory cause of action protecting private sector whistleblowers from
retaliatory discharge).
386. See supra Part II.B.1-3 (The Ninth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits protect
unsolicited internal complaints).

2014]

REINSTATING EMPLOYER ACCOUNTABILITY
BY PROTECTING ALL FORMS OF WHISTLEBLOWING

251

complaint and subsequent termination. 387 Upon making a prima facie
retaliation case, courts are deferential to the employee in considering
whether to dismiss, even if the employer presents an appropriate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging. 388 It seems that Section 510
would provide far more expansive protection to whistleblowing
employees than standard state law anti-retaliation claims.389
D. WHISTLEBLOWING PROTECTION COMPARISON: STATE AND FEDERAL
It is important to note, however, that despite the existence of broad
whistleblowing coverage in certain states, reserving remedies for states
alone would lead to inadequate, parsed whistleblower protection from
state to state.390
1. Comparing State Whistleblowing Laws
Unfortunately, most states have piece-meal whistleblower
protections, which curtail whistleblower protection specifically to
certain sectors of employment (usually public).391 However, some states
have adopted comprehensive Whistleblower Protection Acts for public
and private employees including: Arizona, 392 California, 393
Connecticut, 394 Delaware, 395 Florida, 396 Hawaii, 397 Illinois, 398 Indiana, 399
387. Simons v. Midwest Tel. Sales and Serv., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1007-08
(D. Minn. 2006) (citing Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir.
1992)) (noting that claims brought under Section 510 undergo a three-step burden
shifting framework analysis in which the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case
of retaliation by proving: (1) they participated in a statutorily protected activity; (2) an
adverse employment action was taking against them; and (3) a casual connection
existed between the two).
388. See, e.g., Dunn v. Elco Enters., Inc., No. 05-71801, 2006 WL 1195867, at *9
(E.D. Mich. May 4, 2006) (instructing courts to exercise caution in dismissing once the
employee has established a prima facie case).
389. See NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER, supra note 382.
390. See supra Part III.B.
391. See NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER, supra note 382.
392. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (1995) (West).
393. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 2012).
394. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 2005).
395. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 1703 (West 2013).
396. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102. (West 2013).
397. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 174/15 (West 2002).
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Maine, 400 New Hampshire, 401 New Jersey, 402 North Dakota, 403 Ohio, 404
Rhode Island,405 and Tennessee.406
In understanding the breadth of these states’ whistleblowing
protections, we identify and categorize four categories. 407 These four
categories of protected whistleblowing conduct under state law are: (1)
Reporting to a public authority (2) Reporting to an in-progress
investigation or proceeding (3) Reporting complaints in-house and (4)
Objecting or refusing to participate.408 In terms of the circuit dispute
over protection afforded by Section 510,409 we are particularly interested
in category (3) Reporting complaints in house, as all the cases brought
before the Circuit Court of Appeals fall within this conduct category.410
Many states’ whistleblowing provisions explicitly protect
unsolicited internal complaints made to a supervisor.411 In Arizona, the
law protects disclosures when employees disclose “either [to] the
employer or a representative of the employer who the employee
reasonably believes is in a managerial or supervisory position and has
the authority to investigate the information provided by the employee . .
. .” 412 In Connecticut, whistleblowing protection is afforded when
information “is provided to or the investigation is conducted by . . . a
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 174/15 (West 2002).
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-11-5.5-8 (West 2012).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 833 (2015).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (2009).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2002).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34-01-20 (2010).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (West 2011).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-50-3 (WEST 2008).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (West 2011).
See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 376
(showing varying state whistleblowing statutes that can be arranged into four broad
categories).
408. Id.
409. See supra Part II.
410. Sexton v. Panel Processing, 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014); George v. Junior
Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2012); Edwards v. A.H. Cornell
& Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010); King v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 337 F.3d 421(4th
Cir. 2003); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005); Anderson v.
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999
F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993).
411. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra 376.
412. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 at 3(c)(ii) (1995) (West) (emphasis added).
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person with supervisory authority over the employee, or such other
person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate,
discover or terminate misconduct . . . .”413 In Delaware, employees are
protected if the retaliation occurs “[b]ecause the employee reports
verbally or in writing to the employer or the employee’s supervisor a
violation, which the employee knows or reasonably believes has
occurred or is about to occur unless the employee knows or has reason
to know that the report is false” (emphasis added). 414 Hawaii’s
whistleblowing state laws affords protection if “the employee, or a
person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report to
the employer . . .” an alleged violation (emphasis added).415 Maine also
protects disclosures made to superiors if “[t]he employee, acting in good
faith, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports orally or in
writing to the employer or a public body” what the employee reasonably
believes is a violation of a law or rule (emphasis added).416 New Jersey
state whistleblowing laws protect employees who “[disclose] or
[threaten] to disclose to a supervisor or a public body an activity, policy
or practice” that violates the law (emphasis added). 417 North Dakota
broadly affords whistleblower protection to an “employee, or a person
acting on behalf of an employee, [who] . . . reports a violation or
suspected violation of federal, state, or local law, ordinance, regulation,
or rule to an employer, a governmental body, or a law enforcement
official”.418 In Ohio, employees who reasonably believe a violation has
occurred are protected from whistleblowing retaliation if “the employee
orally [notifies] the employee’s supervisor or other responsible officer
of the employee’s employer” (emphasis added).419 Additionally Rhode
Island whistleblowers are protected from retaliatory actions taken
“[b]ecause the employee reports [a violation] verbally or in writing to
the employer or to the employee’s supervisor” (emphasis added). 420
Although most comprehensive state whistleblowing laws frame the
protection with varying vocabulary and sentence structures, many offer
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1336 (a) (West 2005).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1703(4) (West 2013).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-62 (West 2008).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(1)(A) (2005).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(a) (West 2002).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34-01-20 (1)(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52(A)(1)(a) (West 2011).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-53-3(4) (West 2008)
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employees protection if they are retaliated against for disclosing a
violation to employers or superiors via an internal and unsolicited
complaint.421
The growing trend to extend broad whistleblower coverage is
evident in the additional safeguards state laws have created to protect
whistleblowing employees. 422 As mentioned earlier, the existence of
category (4) Objecting or refusing to participate purposely remains
silent on how or to whom the employee objects in order to work as a
catch-all category. Indiana whistleblowing employees are protected if
they have “objected to an act or omission.”423 In New Hampshire, the
law prohibits retaliation measures if an employee “objects to or refuses
to participate in any activity that the employee, in good faith, believes is
a violation of the law.”424 Additionally, New Jersey whistleblowing laws
protect an employee that “objects to, or refuses to participate in any
activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonable believes” is a
violation of law.425
The lack of whistleblowing uniformity is also evident among states
that possess extensive coverage because each state employs unique
means of protecting employee disclosures. 426 For example, Hawaii’s
extensive whistleblowing state laws protect not just the disclosure
employees make, but also if an employee was “about to” make a
disclosure.427 Thus, the statute uniquely protects those employees who
are retaliated against before they even get an opportunity to make such a
disclosure. 428 Other states, like Florida, distinctively encourage and
promote internal-organization solutions by requiring employees to
disclose to employers in order to provide employers an opportunity to

421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 376
Id.
IND. CODE ANN. §5-11-5.5-8 (a)(1) (West 2012).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2(I)(b) (2009).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(c) (West 2002).
See generally HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-62(2) (West 2002) (providing
whistleblower protection even before making a complaint); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
448.102(1) (West 1991) (requiring disclosure to supervisor or employer before
qualifying for whistleblower protection). NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, supra note 376.
427. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-62(2) (West 2008).
428. Id.
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handle, address or rectify the complaint. 429 Thus, the examination of
broad whistleblowing state laws encourages a broad reading of Section
510 for two distinct reasons: (1) it highlights the growing national trend
to protect whistleblowers and (2) it underscores that if protection is left
solely to the states, whistleblowers will be afforded various levels of
protection depending exclusively upon the state where the action is
brought.
2. Comparison Federal Whistleblowing Laws: Fair Labor Standard Act
In determining the breadth of Section 510’s protection, the circuits
often refer to the Fair Labor Standard Act’s anti-retaliation statute430 as a
comparative tool. 431 Under the FLSA’s whistleblowing provision: “It
shall be unlawful for any person . . . (3) to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to
testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an
industry committee.”432
In 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States considered
whether the FLSA anti-retaliation provision protected oral as well a
written complaints in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp.433 The Supreme Court engaged in a broad purposivist analysis of
anti-retaliation and whistleblowing provisions in Kasten in a manner
that is pertinent and analogous to how Section 510 protection should be
determined.434
Petitioner Kevin Kasten brought a retaliation claim under FLSA
against his former employer Saint-Gorbain Performance Plastics

429.
430.
431.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102(1) (West 2013).
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012).
See generally Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 221-30 (3d
Cir. 2010) (discussing the FLSA in the context of whistleblower protection); Nicolaou
v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 327-29 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing FLSA as a
comparative tool); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427-28 (4th Cir. 2003)
(focusing on the language of FLSA).
432. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012).
433. 131 S. Ct. at 1330.
434. Id. at 1331-36.
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Corporation.435 Kasten alleged that Saint-Gorbain purposely located its
time clocks between where employees removed their work-related gear
and where they worked in order to prevent paying employees for the
time spent putting and taking off their protective work gear.436 Because
this was a clear violation of the FLSA, Kasten brought the time clock’s
location to Saint-Gobain’s attention in accordance with the
organization’s internal grievance-resolution procedure.437 Kasten alleges
he orally discussed that the location of the time clocks could be legally
challenged as a violation to his shift supervisor, the human resources
employee, the operations manager and the lead operator at SaintGobain.438 Due to the conflict among the Circuits regarding whether oral
complaints are protected under the FLSA, the Supreme Court granted
Kasten’s petition certiorari.439
The Kasten court held that, under the FLSA, retaliation against an
employee who “has filed any complaint” includes oral statements
because “filed” sometimes refers to oral statements. 440 The Court,
however, reached this conclusion only after analyzing a variety of
sources.441 The Court looked to other anti-retaliation provision statutes
despite their use of different language.442
First, it noted that some dictionary definitions of “filed”
contemplate the medium of writing. 443 However, other dictionary
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.

Id. at 1329.
Id.
Id. at 1330.
Id.
Id. Compare Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 625-36 (5th
Cir. 2008) (anti-retaliation provision covers oral complaints), and Lambert v. Ackerley,
180 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (same), with Lambert v. Genesee
Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1993), abrogated by Kasten, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (antiretaliation provision does not cover complaints to supervisors). See also Pacheco v.
Whiting Farms, Inc., 365 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2004) (anti-retaliation provision
covers unofficial assertion of rights); E.E.O.C. v. White & Son Enterprises, 881 F.2d
1006, 1011-12 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562-63 (6th
Cir. 2004) (assuming without discussion that oral complaints are covered); Brennan v.
Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975) (same).
440. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1329.
441. Id. at 1331-36.
442. Id. at 1332-33 (citing various anti-retaliation statutes).
443. Id. at 1331 (discussing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY’s
definition of “file”).
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meanings extend the definition to include oral material such as being
included “into the order of business.”444 This is significant because the
Court found the phrase “filed a complaint” was not limited to written
complaints but broadened to encompass oral complaints.445
Moreover, although the language is broader than the phrase “filed
any complaint,” the phrase itself linguistically applies to the broader
oral-inclusive interpretation.446 The Court surmised that the use of this
broader language elsewhere may indicate that Congress (1) wanted to
limit the scope of the phrase to writing only, or (2) did not consider a
different phraseology made a significant difference in the mediums of
oral or writing.447
Additionally, the Court focused on the general usage of the term
“file” by legislators, administrators, and judges. 448 The Court
acknowledged that state statutes often consider oral filings. 449
Regulations promulgated by federal agencies sometimes permit
complaints to be filed orally.450 Additionally, judges use the term “filed”
to contemporaneously include written and oral mediums. 451 Thus, the
Supreme Court considered the function and objective of the Act to
determine the meaning of the FLSA phrase “filed any complaint.”452
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the FLSA phrase protecting
employees who have “filed any complaint” acknowledged that the
provision in isolation may be open to competing interpretations. 453
However, the Court determined that only one interpretation is
permissible when considering the purpose and context of the
provision. 454 The Court noted that the Act sought to prohibit “labor
444. Id. (discussing FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE’s definition of “file”).
445. Id.
446. Id. at 1333.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 1331.
449. See id. (citing various state statutes using the word “‘file’ in conjunction with
oral statements”).
450. See id. at 1331-32 (citing examples of regulations permitting complaints to be
filed orally).
451. See id. at 1332 (citing instances where courts acknowledged oral filings prior to
the FLSA).
452. Id. at 1333-34.
453. Id. at 1330-31.
454. Id.
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conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers.” 455 The anti-retaliation provision particularly makes the
enforcement scheme effective by removing an employee’s “fear of
economic retaliation” and allowing them to not “quietly . . . accept
substandard conditions.” 456 The Court questioned whether Congress
would want to limit the effectiveness of the Act by only protecting the
complaints provided in writing, thus effectively marginalizing illiterate,
less educated or overworked workers. 457 The Court especially
recognized that Congress was influenced by President Roosevelt’s
message that workers were in desperate need of an Act that could
protect them.458 Thus, ultimately the Supreme Court’s decision suggests
that when dealing with ambiguous anti-retaliation provisions, courts
should strive to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the statute’s
purpose.459
The Court noted that limiting the anti-retaliation provision solely to
written complaints would negate the Act’s flexibility, ultimately
preventing its effectiveness.460 It would prevent the implementation of
hotlines, interviews or any other oral means of receiving complaints.461
The Court also recognized and was persuaded by decisions and
arguments articulated by the Secretary of the Department of Labor.462
This encouraged courts to broadly construe the interpretation of antiretaliation statutes to allow additional means by which an employee may

455.
456.

Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1333 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288,
292 (1960)).
457. Id. at 1333.
458. Id. (noting President Franklin Roosevelt had pointed out worker were in need
of the Act’s help).
459. See id. at 1331 (“considering the provision in conjunction with the [statute’s]
purpose and context leads us to conclude that only one interpretation is permissible”).
460. Id. at 1334.
461. Id.; see Fair Labor Standards Act, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF Labor,
http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-flsa.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2014)
(directing participants who wish to “file a complaint” to contact a local office “or call
the Department’s Toll–Free Wage and Hour Help Line at 1–866–4–US–WAGE”).
462. See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1335 (“The Secretary of Labor has consistently held
the view that the words ‘filed any complaint’ cover oral, as well as written,
complaints.”).
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submit violations in order to promote, not curtail, the legislation’s
effectiveness.463
The Court did concede to Saint-Gobain’s argument that the statute
required fair notice.464 The Court, however, explained that it would be
difficult for an employer, who is unaware an employee has made a
complaint, to discriminate due to that complaint. 465 Additionally, fair
notice is not limited to writing.466 Furthermore, although the consulted
sources (definitions, statutes, regulations, judicial opinions) grouped
writing and oral statements, the term “filing” did indicate a serious
occurrence.467 Thus, the court required that in order to fall under the antretaliation provisions protection, a complaint must be clear and detailed
regardless of what medium it is presented in.468
E. OBSTACLE OF ACHIEVING A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 510:
TEXTUALISM
The circuit split regarding Section 510’s interpretation is likely to
be resolved if the Supreme Court grants certiorari.469 Upon addressing
the issue, some justices may find Justice Antonin Scalia, an avid
proponent, legal theorist and practitioner of textualism, to be highly
influential.470
Textualism proposes that the text is the starting point for all
statutory interpretation and that one must follow the statutory plain
meaning if the text is clear.471 Textualists stress that legislative history
should not be consulted, because the role of the judge is to be focused
on applying the text of a statute, not deciphering the meaning and
463. Id. at 1336 (“We conclude that the Seventh Circuit erred in determining that
oral complaints cannot fall within the scope of the phrase “‘filed any complaint’ in the
Act’s anti-retaliation provision.”).
464. Id. at 1334.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 1333.
468. Id.
469. See generally id. at 1336 (resolving the circuit court split over FLSA’s antiretaliation clause by granting certiorari and holding oral complaints as protected).
470. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Book Review: The New Textualism and Normative
Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (discussing the impact of Justice Scalia’s
position as a textualist).
471. Id.
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purpose of it. 472 This textualist approach arises out of wariness of
judicial activism; if the words themselves don’t command the result, it is
the legislature’s, not judiciary’s job to import that meaning.473
Textualists, like Scalia, criticize the approach some judges apply in
interpreting the meaning and parameters of a statute. 474 Although a
broader expansionary interpretation may put into context the purpose of
the provision and also harmonize the entire U.S. Code to solve a
mischief, textualists fundamentally reject this approach. 475 Unless said
explicitly, Justice Scalia and other textualist justices will not force intent
within the text because textualism employs a narrow approach to
Congressional intent. 476 Thus, textualists are fundamentally pitted
against purposivists who focus their statutory interpretation on the
purpose and intent of the enacted legislation. 477 In his book Reading
Law, Justice Scalia stresses the superiority of a textualist approach
because otherwise judges will not refrain from reading their own values
into the statutes whereas textualism places a rein on imputing personal
judicial values.478
Justice Scalia passionately advocated and implemented this exact
textualist interpretative approach in his Kasten dissent.479 Justice Scalia
argued that the Supreme Court should affirm the Seventh Circuit’s
judgment for the employer on the grounds that Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §215(a)(3) covers only written complaints. 480 He
criticizes the majority’s examination of modern state and federal
statutes, arguing that the only relevance of such provisions is that none
of them achieves results by using the phrase “filed any complaint” in
their language to include complaints, submitted to employers. 481

472.
473.
474.
475.

Id.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 532.
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012).
476. See Eskridge, supra note 470, at 532.
477. Id. at 533.
478. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 475, at 16.
479. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1336
(2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
480. Id. at 1336-67.
481. Id. at 1339. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (prohibiting retaliation against
employees who “oppos[e] any [unlawful] practice”).
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Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s dissent stresses that “[w]hile the
jurisprudence of this Court has sometimes sanctioned a ‘living
Constitution,’ it has never approved a living United States Code.” 482
Therefore, Justice Scalia reasons that Congress’s 1938 enactment must
be applied based on the language of the text, not in accordance with
what modern Congress (or this Court) would prefer.483
This Note has addressed such as the purpose of whistleblowing
provisions and the foundational intent surrounding ERISA’s
enactment. 484 Instead, textualists would simply refer to Section 510’s
language to decipher if it has plain meaning.485 If plain in meaning, the
text will be applied as is, if not then textualists will seek to use that
particular language’s definitions and colloquialisms to decipher its
meaning.486
A textualist approach removes all legislative history and purpose
when considering a provision’s correct interpretation. 487 Justice Scalia
stressed that, although the Secretary of Labor has the authority to issue
regulations under the legislative provisions, they possess no authority in
interpreting regulations or provisions.488 Justice Scalia would argue that
providing any deference or consideration to the briefs submitted by the
Secretary of the Department of Labor would be improper.489
Thus, even though granting certiorari would fundamentally resolve
the split among circuits as to if Section 510 protects unsolicited internal
complaints, such an interpretation may fail if there are enough Justices
willing to embrace the textualist approach. 490 Additionally, it is
important to note that behind philosophical interpretations lurk policy
preferences. 491
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.

Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
See supra Part III.
See Eskridge, supra note 470, at 532.
Id.
Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1339-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1340.
Id.
Eskridge, supra note 470, at 532.
Michael A Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter?
Unpacking Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 AMERICAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE REVIEW No. 3 (Aug. 2008.), available at http://faculty.georgetown.edu/
baileyma/Bailey_Law_APSR2008.pdf (discussing the effect of personal policy
preferences upon judicial voting).
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IV. SECTION 510 SHOULD PROTECT ALL WHISTLEBLOWING
COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO SUBMIT UNSOLICITED
INTERNAL COMPLAINTS
Part IV of this Note extends Section 510’s future reach by
proposing a judicial-based solution grounded in the inherent ambiguity
and a legislative-based solution that would lead to a broader, protective
reading. Then this part explores the adverse policy ramifications of
limiting Section 510’s protection to not cover unsolicited internal
complaints. This part concludes with the consideration of the various
policy and social benefits Section 510 would provide if its protection
were not limited by any requirement of formality or solicitation.
A. JUDICIAL CONFLICT SOLUTION: AMBIGUITY
The conflict among the seven circuits about whether unsolicited
internal complaints are protected inherently reveals the ambiguity of
Section 510. 492 The Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits endorse a broad
reading of Section 510 to include unsolicited internal complaints under
the federal anti-retaliation remedies available to whistleblowers.493 On
the other hand, the Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuits have denied
unsolicited internal complaints relief under ERISA, leaving employees
to find remedies under state law. 494 Since Kasten does not provide
decisive instruction, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in order
to explicitly resolve the circuit split,495 and instruct that ambiguous antiretaliation statutes, like Section 510, must be resolved in favor of
employees. 496 This will re-establish an equal level of protection for
whistleblowing employees of all the United States circuits, regardless of
what form or to whom they disclose alleged ERISA complaints.497
492.
493.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B for discussion of circuits that protect internal, unsolicited
internal complaints.
494. See supra Part II.C for discussion of circuits that deny protecting unsolicited
internal complaints; see also supra Part III.C for discussion of limited remedies
available under state law wrongful discharge causes of action.
495. See supra Part II.D.
496. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331
(2011); Crawford v. Metro. of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 278-79 (2009).
497. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331 (2011); Crawford, 555 U.S. at 278-79.
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B. LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT SOLUTION: ‘INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL’ AND
‘SOLICITED OR UNSOLICITED’
Although the Supreme Court may resolve the conflict, Congress
should also amend ERISA to provide unambiguous protection to all
whistleblowers that submit alleged ERISA violations, regardless of how
or to whom they complain. 498 Solving the conflict between internal and
external could be simply accomplished by editing Section 510 to
protect:
Any person who gives solicited or unsolicited information internally
or externally or is solicited or unsolicited to testify or about to testify
in any internal or external inquiry or proceeding relating to ERISA.

The addition of these phrases promptly clarifies that Section 510
protects all complaints, whether internal or external and/or solicited or
unsolicited. 499 It will also adhere to the rationale put forth by the
Secretary of Labor and the Ninth Circuit, and recognize that a complaint
lodged by an employee, even internally, is protected as the first step in
an “inquiry or proceeding.”500 Such an interpretation is consistent with
the purpose of Section 510, 501 protects the Department of Labor’s
interests,502 aligns with Supreme Court’s recent FLSA whistleblowing
decision in Kasten,503 avoids the unequal protection of whistleblowers
via circuit jurisdictions or via state whistleblowing laws,504 and works in
conjunction with the growing state and federal trend to protect
whistleblowers 505 in an effort in increase disclosure, transparency and
accountability.506

498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.

Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331 (2011); Crawford, 555 U.S. at 278-79.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.A and Part II.B.1.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra Part III.C.1.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part I.B.
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C. ADVERSE RAMIFICATIONS OF APPLYING A NARROW INTERPRETATION
If implemented, a narrow approach would yield significant and farreaching adverse ramifications. 507 Excluding unsolicited internal
complaints will discourage employees from reporting employer’s
ERISA violations, undermining the purpose of Section 510.508 Should
employees decide to stay silent as a result, ERISA’s primary
enforcement method would fail and ultimately obstruct Congress’s
intention to ensure accountability. 509 Additionally, if the law limits
participants and beneficiaries from using reporting mechanisms, the
protective force of the whistleblowing provision will weaken. 510
Moreover, this interpretation would encourage managers to simply fire
whistleblowers before enough information could be solicited to initiate
formal inquiry or proceeding.511
Overall, the narrow interpretation would damage an organization’s
communication and efficiency in solving existing problems internally,
because whistleblowers would be forced to take the more drastic step
and immediately go directly to the public or an external governing party
to disclose alleged violations. 512 This contravenes established
congressional goals because it would prevent an organization from
conducting a cost-effective internal inquiry or resolution of the merits of
a complaint.513

507. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellant for Reversal at *10, Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3198), (explaining the widespread ramifications of adopting a
narrow interpretation of Section 510).
508. Id. at *23.
509. Id. at *22-23.
510. Id. at *22.
511. Id. at *10.
512. See e.g., Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff Appellant for Reversal at *17, Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332
(6th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1604) (explaining organizational ramifications of adopting a
narrow approach).
513. Id. at *17; see also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S.
Ct. 1325, 1334 (2011) (not protecting internal complaints “discourage[s] the use of
desirable informal workplace grievance procedures”).
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D. SOCIETAL AND POLICY BENEFITS OF APPLYING A BROAD
INTERPRETATION
Even when setting aside the overwhelming support for a broad
interpretation of Section 510, 514 extending Section 510 protection to
unsolicited internal employee complaints provides many extrinsic
benefits.
A broad interpretation would encourage the key policy of
encouraging internal complaints as they are often the most effective and
direct way to bring forth an objection on an issue requiring attention.515
Protecting and encouraging internal complaints would validate
grievance procedures and provide supervisors an internal opportunity to
remedy or address the validity of the objection before outside parties
became involved.516 This allows Section 510 to stay true to its protective
purpose,517 especially since the weakening of other ERISA provisions—
civil remedies 518 and preemption 519 —undermine remedies, 520 which
mandate employer accountability to uphold their fiduciary duties. 521
Additionally, a broader interpretation provides the flexibility to allow
organizations to solve issues internally without the added pressures of
negative publicity, legal costs, reputational harm, and drop in company
stock price that accompanies external whistleblowing disclosures.522
The arguments, which opponents of a broad Section 510
interpretation put forth, as articulated by the Second, Third, Fourth and
Sixth Circuit’s decisions, are far-reaching and unpersuasive. 523 Such
514.
515.

See supra Part III.
Terry Morehead Dworkin & Melissa S. Baucus, Internal vs. External
Whistleblower: A Comparison of Whistleblowing Processes, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1281,
1297 (1998).
516. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1334.
517. See supra Part I.C.
518. See supra Part I.B.2.
519. See supra Part I.B.3.
520. See supra Part I.B.
521. See supra Part I.B.4.
522. Robert M. Bowen, et. al., Whistle-Blowing: Target Firm Characteristics and
Economic Consequences, 85 ACCT. REV. 1239, 1250-55 (2010).
523. Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332, 334-35 (6th Cir. 2014);
Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010); Nicolau v.
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opponents argue the inclusion of unsolicited internal complaints would
cause Section 510 to be evoked liberally. 524 Specifically, protecting
unsolicited internal complaints would “tip the balance of ERISA” and
jeopardize employer’s prerogative to make legitimate business judgment
decisions.525 Additionally, proponents of a narrow interpretation argue
that embracing a broad protection would essentially “create ‘tenure for
all employees who deal with ERISA related issues, including
bookkeepers, human resource personnel, in house counsel, and health
insurance brokers, etc. and would harm the corporation’s ability to make
legitimate business decisions.’” 526 However, these arguments are
unconvincing and overreaching because employees who alleged Section
510 retaliation claims must still prove a prima facie case of retaliation.527
Even if courts broadly construe Section 510, plaintiffs must
establish a prima facie case of retaliation or interference by showing
“that (1) he participated in a protected activity . . . (2) he suffered an
adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal connection
between the two events.”528 Even when a plaintiff establishes a prima
facia case for retaliation, if the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the burden again shifts back to the
plaintiff to prove that the proffered reason is not pretextual.529 Because
the burden remains upon plaintiffs, Section 510 should be broadly
interpreted to include unsolicited internal complaints.
CONCLUSION
As a key safeguard in holding employers accountable to their
fiduciary duties, it is exceptionally important that Section 510 of ERISA

524. See Brief for Appellee at *14, A.H. Cornell, 610 F.3d 217 (No. 09-3198), 2009
WL 6870705.
525. Id.
526. Brief for the Appellees at *14, Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d
217 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3198) (arguing the dangers of including unsolicited internal
complaints within Section 510).
527. See Simons v. Midwest Tel. Sales & Serv., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1007-08
(D. Minn. 2006) (quoting Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th
Cir. 1992)).
528. See Sturge v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1044 (D. Minn.
2009).
529. See Rath, 978 F.2d at 1090.
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protect all individuals who allege any violations, regardless of the
complaint’s form. To do so truly promotes the intention, purpose and
protection of ERISA. Barring unsolicited internal, complaints, however,
would alienate or harm vulnerable individuals who faithfully report
alleged violations only to be retaliated against with no redress—all
simply due to the form of their complaint. Moreover, the additional
modes of communication and internal investigations advanced by
broadening protection to internal, unsolicited internal complaints would
quickly eliminate baseless complaints and allow corporations to solve
unintentional oversights without external interference. In reference to
the persisting circuit conflict, this Note offers both a judicial and
congressional based solution to expand Section 510’s protective reach to
unsolicited internal complaints. Either of these approaches will
successfully broaden Section 510’s scope for all circuits and ultimately
will safeguard employee benefits, promote disclosures, facilitate internal
solutions and continue to keep employers accountable.

